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How do legislators allocate policy-making authority? At least in the legal context,
distribution-of-power arrangements are usually articulated in written documents.
Unfortunately, extracting these relationships is difficult, leading scholars to restrict
themselves to studies of single policy areas or to a small set of high-visibility laws.
In this project, I address this limitation through a neural network-based approach
that extracts power relationships from legal language in a scalable, valid fashion. I
then apply this approach to study institutional design in enacted US legislation.
Substantively, I demonstrate that policy preferences of executive and legislative ac-
tors exert surprisingly little influence on formal institutional design choices. For all
but the most politically salient laws, implementation arrangements are structured by
the policy area and issue under consideration rather than elite political preferences.
This argument - which would not have been possible to test without the measure-
ment tools I develop - highlights both the importance of the tools I develop and the
need for scalable measurement techniques in political science.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Statutory Design in Public and Academic Discourse
How do legislators allocate policy-making authority? As any would-be lawyer knows,
statutes, constitutions, and other formal legal texts establish relationships between
actors, describing who can do what, when, and to whom. However, the nature and
complexity of the institutional structures created by these texts varies enormously.
To take a pair of (seemingly) extreme examples from American politics, the Clean
Air Act grants the Environmental Protection Agency sole decision-making author-
ity over most policy decisions, while the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA) divides decision-making authority between the Departments of Labor,
Treasury, Health and Human Services, and Veterans’ Affairs, as well as various sub-
ordinate agencies and other institutions.
In public discourse, debates surrounding formally-articulated power structures usu-
ally reduce to an efficiency/accountability tradeoff. For a concrete example, again
consider the ACA. As a core part of Barack Obama’s first-term agenda, the ACA
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represented a sweeping overhaul of the American healthcare system, which expanded
availability of public and private insurance plans and empowered regulators to im-
plement an wider set of health insurance regulations. Supporters argued that these
changes would protect consumers and would empower expert administrators to in-
crease the overall efficiency of the healthcare system. Detractors, by contrast, worried
that the ACA placed undue authority with unelected bureaucrats, who might inter-
fere with individual citizens’ healthcare choices. The discussion surrounding so-called
“death panels” offers a immediate example of these concerns. Though fantastical, the
fear that government regulators might be given the authority to control end-of-life
decision-making for Medicare patients resonated with voters, and represented one of
the most durable talking points in the entire ACA debate (Oberlander 2012).
As the “death panel” example suggests, both public and academic debates regarding
legislative proposals often reduce to arguments regarding the content of the text
in question. At first glance, basic factual disagreements of this kind might seem
surprising. After all, in the United States texts of proposed bills are publicly available
as soon as they are formally introduced on the floor of Congress, allowing interested
academics or members of the public to peruse their contents. Unfortunately, when
dealing with complex and highly-technical documents, access to text is not the same
as access to information. Most legal documents are long, complex, and written
with a specialized audience in mind, preventing non-experts from extracting relevant
information regarding their topic area or the administrative structures they create.
As a result, despite their importance few people actually read legal texts, limiting
ordinary citizens’ ability to engage with the contents of these documents and leaving
2
members of the media vulnerable to rumors or misinformation campaigns.
1.2 Measurement Limitations as Theoretical Constraints
The academic literature on formal allocation of authority follows similar themes to
these public discussions. Like members of the broader public, political scientists and
legal scholars generally frame allocation of authority decisions using an efficiency/ac-
countability tradeoff, in which legislators must balance efficiency and responsiveness
against oversight over - and protection against - executive malfeasance (e.g. Moe
1990b; McCubbins 1985). Particularly in the American context, scholars have for-
malized this intuition through versions of the “ally principle” (Epstein and O’Halloran
1999; Huber and Shipan 2002; Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Franchino 2007; Gail-
mard and Patty 2012; Farhang and Yaver 2016). When the executive’s interests are
aligned with those of the legislature (and are likely to remain so in the future), these
authors argue, legislators are more willing to pass simple, “framework” legislation,
and leave implementation choices to the bureaucracy. By contrast, when legislative
and executive interests diverge (or might do so in the future), legislators tend to
favor complex institutional structures, which provide greater oversight opportunities
and divide decision-making authority among a wider array of implementing bodies.
Beyond these basic political factors, however, we should also expect the design of a
given legal document should be affected by characteristics of the issues and policy
areas the document addresses (e.g. Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). For example, we
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should expect lawmakers to be more willing to design complex, cross-cutting decision-
making structures when addressing issues that implicate multiple policy areas or
policy areas in which lawmakers possess some preexisting expertise. Work from both
the rational choice and bounded rationality literatures suggests that factors such as
these should represent some of the most important predictors of formal allocation
of authority, which need to be considered alongside preference-related variables in
order to fully capture the complexity of the lawmaking process.
Unfortunately, while issue and policy area variables have been discussed extensively
in the theoretical literature on formal allocation of authority, ideas like these are
largely ignored in empirically-oriented scholarship. Largely, this limitation results
from a measurement problem. Even for motivated and well-resourced academics,
reading and interpreting legal texts is labor-intensive. As a result, most empirical
work on allocation of authority has been restricted to single policy areas or to small
sets of “important” legislation. For example, Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) and
Farhang and Yaver (2016) only examine legislation on Mayhew (1991)’s list of “im-
portant” national-level American legislation, while Huber and Shipan (2002) focus
exclusively on bills addressing health policy.
These self-imposed constraints are sensible - and, indeed, necessary, with existing
measurement technology - but they are also limiting. As I argue in this dissertation,
we should expect formal institutional design choices in most lawmaking scenarios to
be shaped by attributes of the policy area(s) and issue(s) under consideration, rather
than the preferences of executive and legislative actors. Preference-oriented expla-
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nations, I suggest, help explain institutional design choices contained in “important”,
high-visibility legislation, but have limited utility outside of this domain.
1.3 A Text-as-Data Approach
In this dissertation, I address these limitations in three parts. First, from a theo-
retical standpoint, I provide a cognitive microfoundation for many of the existing
theories regarding formal institutional design. Broadly, I argue that the process of
constructing a legal document is best viewed in terms of a cognitive cost-benefit
analysis. When writing a legal text, lawmakers must weigh the policy and political
benefits offered by a complex, highly detailed institutional structure against the cog-
nitive costs that designing such structures imposes. Viewed from this perspective,
we should expect lawmakers to be most willing to create complex institutional struc-
tures when (1) the issue under consideration implicates multiple policy areas and
(2) lawmakers possess some preexisting expertise in the policy area in question. For
sufficiently important issues, we might also expect preference disagreements between
the executive and legislative branches to prompt lawmakers to create more complex
institutional structures, but this relationship is likely to be weak in other situations.
Second, I introduce a novel conceptualization and measurement approach designed to
help capture the content of formal legal texts. I argue that formal legal documents are
best viewed as relational documents, which describe which actors can do what, when,
and to whom. This network of inter-actor relationships, I suggest, forms what we
5
might call an “implementing network”, which describes the institutional content of the
document. After describing this conceptual paradigm, I operationalize this scheme
using a series of entity and relation extraction techniques drawn from computational
linguistics and computer science, and assess its performance on an original dataset
of enacted American legislation.
This approach has two major advantages over existing work. From an academic per-
spective, transforming texts into implementing networks allows researchers to for-
mulate questions regarding the relationship between background political and policy
factors and downstream allocation of authority in a coherent theoretical and statisti-
cal framework. Network analysis is a mature field, which offers an array of straight-
forward measures that neatly align with theoretically important concepts such as
institutional complexity and fragmentation. Perhaps more importantly, however,
this approach also offers substantial descriptive utility. Representing bills as net-
works of inter-actor relationships offers an intuitive way for non-experts to grasp
the basic institutional structures they create. While information of this kind clearly
cannot replace expert judgments in a legal or policy setting, this information can
help inform public discourse, allowing members of the media and the public to more
easily rebut concerns like the ACA “death panel” example I cite at the outset of this
section.
Third, from a substantive standpoint I use the techniques I develop to study lawmak-
ing patterns in both American enacted legislation and the US Consolidated Code. In
particular, I focus on studying the effects of policy complexity and issue prioritization
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on the structure of downstream legislation. Though well-studied in the theoretical
and broader policy design literatures (e.g. Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Bendor and
Meirowitz 2004; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Baumgart-
ner and Jones 2010; Jones and Baumgartner 2012; Shaffer et al. 2016), due to the
data limitations I outline previously most preexisting studies have either ignored the
relationship between these ideas and formal allocation of authority, or studied their
relationship across a limited set of policy areas or legislative documents. The mea-
surement techniques I develop allow me to address these relationships in a unified
modeling context and to study texts addressing low-attention policy areas and issues.
1.4 Limitations of this Study
As I emphasize throughout the preceding discussion, my focus on this dissertation is
on formal (textually-articulated) distribution of authority. Before proceeding, it is
worth pausing to consider the limits imposed by this choice. Clearly, written agree-
ments such as statutes and constitutions do not necessarily represent the actual,
on-the-ground distribution of power across a bureaucracy or government, which is
determined at least as much by informal practice and circumstances as by formal
obligations (see, e.g., Carpenter and Krause 2015). Similarly, these kinds of docu-
ments also do not represent either the starting or ending point of the contractual
negotiating process for any given institution. Instead, written agreements are best
viewed as a function of the incentives, interests, and balance of power among the
relevant parties at a particular point in time, as well as the anticipated future state
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of these features.
Thus, though documents like statutes and constitutions are relevant to the day-to-
day functioning of a bureaucracy or a government, they are most directly informative
about the political and institutional processes that produced their provisions. As a
result, for the remainder of this paper, I focus on questions related to these processes,
and present a number of hypotheses and conceptual ideas related to the legislative
systems and practices that underlie them.
Importantly, though, this focus on political negotiation should not suggest that for-
mal allocation-of-authority decisions possess little or no practical impact. Clearly,
the relationship between formal, legally-articulated power structures and day-to-day
practice and outputs is itself an empirical question, which is likely closer or more
distant depending on the particular substantive and institutional setting. However,
in order to investigate the relationship between text and practice, we first need to
understand the text, both in a descriptive sense and in terms of the political and
institutional processes that produced that text. As such, though I do not directly
address the actual institutional practices and outputs of the governing bodies and
agencies I examine, this study is relevant to these institutions, and offers insights
regarding the relationship between formal agreements and on-the-ground practice.
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1.5 Roadmap
The organization of this dissertation roughly mirrors the three-part organizational
scheme I articulate above. In Chapter 2, I begin by outlining the existing work on
formal allocation of authority in the political science and legal literatures. I then
offer a cognitive microfoundation that unifies and extends many of the ideas pre-
sented in existing studies. I focus particularly on highlighting the ways in which
this framework should lead us to develop different theoretical expectations for “im-
portant” laws compared with their more “everyday” counterparts. Finally, I use this
microfoundation to develop expectations regarding the relationships between policy
area, preference disagreements, and downstream allocation of authority choices.
In Chapter 3, I build upon this theoretical material by introducing, implementing,
and testing a novel measurement scheme designed to capture textually-articulated
allocation of authority. I begin by introducing a novel, network-based conceptualiza-
tion of formal authority. I then implement a neural network-based network extraction
approach, which I test on an original dataset consisting of all enacted American leg-
islation passed from 1990-2016. Finally, I present a series of case studies designed to
illustrate both the utility and the face validity of the approach I develop.
Starting in Chapter 4, I shift away from theory-building, conceptualization, and
measurement, and use the framework I develop in my first two chapters to answer
the questions I outline at the outset of this dissertation. In Chapter 4, I focus on
the American enacted legislation I use to train and test the measurement approach
I describe in Chapter 3. For each bill in the dataset, I extract an implementing
9
network, which I use to generate a measure of fragmentation in the bill. I then use a
Bayesian hierarchical model to examine fragmentation patterns across the dataset.
As predicted, outside of “important”, high-salience laws, the relationship between
ideological variables and downstream allocation of authority is weak. Rather, most
implementing decisions are shaped primarily by characteristics of the policy area
under consideration.
Finally, in Chapter 5 I use a similar approach to the one I present in Chapter 4 to
examine over-time variation in statutory fragmentation in the US Code. Using the
tools I develop in Chapters 3 and 4, I generate a dataset consisting of year-on-year
changes in fragmentation values for all chapters of the US Code from 1995-2016. I
then model these changes using a Bayesian hierarchical model. I find that executive-
legislative preference disagreements have a limited impact in this context. After
controlling for policy context, fragmentation in the Code increases no faster under
unified than divided government, reinforcing the findings I offer in Chapter 4.
10
Chapter 2
Cognitive Foundations of Formal Power
In the political science and legal literatures, formal (textually-defined) distribution of
authority is a key phenomenon of interest (Moe 2012; Carpenter and Krause 2015).
Social scientists are often interested in studying the inputs, outputs, and performance
of various organizations (e.g. economic performance of a business, or policy choices
by a government). Clearly, design of decision-making structures play a critical role
in research programs of this sort. Whatever the institution of interest, the allocation
of power within that institution plays a critical role in determining the substantive
goals it pursues and the efficacy with which it achieves those goals.
Generally speaking, scholars have treated formal allocation of authority as a princi-
pal/agent problem, in which legislators are forced to balance efficiency and respon-
siveness against procedural protections and oversight mechanisms. As Moe (1990a;
1990b) and Moe and Caldwell (1994) note, restrictions on implementer discretion are
costly to implement. As a result, policymakers will only restrict executive authority
when they have a strong incentive to do so. In most studies, legislative/executive
disagreement provides the necessary motivation. When executive and legislative
11
actors disagree on policy preferences, these authors suggest, the legislature should
be more willing to constrain executive power by creating restrictive, cross-cutting
institutional arrangements.
This preference-oriented theoretical framework is appealing and influential, and has
helped to motivate an array of important theoretical and empirical projects. How-
ever, it is also limited. As I argue in this chapter, however, work in this domain
largely ignores the role of the policy areas and issues under consideration in a given
law. These factors, I suggest, likely exert substantial influence over downstream
design of legislation;
The remainder of this chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I provide an overview
of the types of language present in legal documents, and emphasize this project’s
focus on language addressing formal allocation of implementing authority. Second, I
outline the existing work on formal allocation of authority in political science, with a
focus on the literature’s strengths and weaknesses as applied to “everyday” lawmaking
choices. Third, I use these ideas to develop a general policy- and issue-centric theory
of formal institutional design, which - I argue - is better-able to explain formal
institutional design choices contained in both “important” and more commonplace
lawmaking activities.
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2.1 Conceptualizing Formal Power
When a policymaker writes or modifies a formal policy document - such as a consti-
tution, law, or administrative regulation - that policymaker must choose from a range
of possible textual models. At one extreme, she could articulate her objectives in
great detail, with measurable policy goals, concrete deadlines and procedural require-
ments, and complex decision-making procedures requiring approval from a variety of
individuals or institutions. At the other, she could write a simple “framework” docu-
ment, which contains vague policy objectives and delegates most authority to one or
a few implementing actors. For a concrete example of these archetypes, contrast the
Indian Constitution with its counterpart from the United States. At some 145,000
words, the Indian Constitution is one of the longest in-force national-level founding
texts, with detailed information regarding the internal organization of government,
individual-level fundamental rights and duties, and national-level ideals and aspira-
tions. The United States Constitution, by contrast, covers only 7,600 words, with
few details on any of these topics.
Of course, few legal texts differ as extremely as these. Rather, most documents
offer varying levels of specificity across various types of language, with some offering
detailed institutional arrangements but vague policy prescriptions and others offering
the opposite. Again, for concreteness, consider the following three examples:
Endangered Species Act:1
116 U.S.C. 1533(a)(1-2)
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The Secretary [of the Interior] shall [. . . ] determine whether any species is an en-
dangered species or a threatened species because of any of the following factors:
1. the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habi-
tat or range;
2. overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes.
National Defense Authorization Act of 2004:2
The Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, in consultation with the Secre-
tary of Defense, the Administrator of General Services, and the Director of the Office
of Personnel Management, shall develop and implement a plan to ensure that the
Federal Government maintains the necessary capability with respect to the acquisi-
tion of architectural and engineering services.
Constitution of India:3
The executive power of the Union shall be vested in the President and shall be
exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance
with this Constitution.
Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the supreme command
of the Defence Forces of the Union shall be vested in the President and the exercise
thereof shall be regulated by law.
These three provisions come from different countries (the United States and India)
and different types of legal documents (two ordinary statutes and one national con-
stitution). All, however, offer good examples of the kinds of content present in legal
texts. Each excerpt clearly addresses a particular policy issue (environment; arms
procurement; executive power and defense) and allocates decision-making authority
to one or a collection of actors. The first and second excerpts also at least im-
241 U.S.C. 1128
3Constitution of India (1949), Art. 53(1-2).
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plicitly articulate a policy goal (biodiversity protection; maintenance of engineering
expertise), while the second provides for oversight over the implementing actor’s dis-
cretionary authority. Moreover, each provision offers a differing level of specificity
on each of these dimensions, with the first offering a detailed set of policy goals but
little procedural detail and the second providing the opposite.
Faced with this linguistic variability, scholars have developed a variety of schemes to
conceptualize the types of ideas contained within legal texts. McCubbins (1985, 724-
729), for example, uses a multilevel scheme, which separates post-hoc oversight and
management rules (e.g. regulations regarding oversight hearings or appropriations
decisions) from formalized, “structural” language allocating and restricting decision-
making powers to particular actors. Within the structural subcategory, he identifies a
number of separate sub-types, including institutional rules (i.e. number and identity
of actors authorized to act in a particular policy area), procedural requirements,
and internal organization rules for relevant organizations. Epstein and O’Halloran
(1999, 101) and related authors (Franchino 2004, 2007; Ainsworth and Harward 2009;
Oosterwaal et al. 2012) divide much further, identifying as many as 14 separate
constraint types in the documents they examine. Finally, Huber and Shipan lump
these categories together, measuring policy-specific language rather than specific
restriction types (Huber and Shipan 2002; Huber and McCarty 2004).
All of these schemes are useful, and all help categorize the types of implementing
language present in legal texts. However, for the purposes of this project, I focus
language involving distribution of authority. McCubbins (1985, 725-726), in his in-
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stitutional sub-category, provides a useful summary of these kinds of rules:
Regulations can be administered through civil or criminal suits in the
courts, or through independent commissions or executives agencies, through
discretion granted to the president or state and local entities [...] The
choice of institutional setting by [a legislature] involves a decision on how
much independence [that legislature] wishes to grant the administrators
(independence from [legislative] control) and the extent to which other
decision-makers [...] restrict or influence the choices of the administrators.
This focus on authority-allocating language - which is closely related to the idea
of “fragmentation” explored by Kagan (2009), Biber (2011), and Farhang and Yaver
(2016) - narrows researcher attention to a pair of simple questions: within a particular
legal text, who is empowered to do what? And, to whom?
Limiting our attention to the institutional language contained in legal texts is nec-
essarily restrictive. However, there are good reasons to believe that the kinds of
authority-allocating decisions this emphasis highlights are some of the most impor-
tant choices that policymakers face during the policy design process. By manip-
ulating the background institutional structure, legislators can force implementing
actors to cooperate with other (often hostile) players, altering downstream policy
outcomes and restricting implementer discretion. Directive policy language, on the
other hand, does not always have such a clear downstream impact. As with all tex-
tual provisions, evidentiary requirements, deadlines, and substantive decision-making
standards only constrain implementor authority to the extent that they are actually
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enforced. But, virtually all legal language is compatible with an array of interpre-
tations and implementation styles. Institutional structures can help sharpen these
constraints, assigning other actors to monitor, amend, and approve agency policies.
2.2 The Existing Work
2.2.1 Institutional Setting and the Costs of Complexity
As I note at the outset of this chapter, detailed policy language - institutional or
otherwise - is not ex ante desirable. Complicated power-sharing arrangements that
fragment implementing authority across an array of actors dramatically curtails ad-
ministrative flexibility, reducing implementer responsiveness and promoting policy
gridlock. Moreover, detailed authority structures are not costless to create. If a
policymaker wants to design a complex policy structure with the intention of accom-
plishing a policy objective, he or she needs to devote substantial time and attention
to the process, which usually involves a substantial quantity of research, expert con-
sultation, and experimentation. In complex policy areas, where the links between
policy and outcomes are more uncertain, these problems are particularly severe (Ben-
dor and Meirowitz 2004; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 73-75, 84-85). Installing “fire
alarms” (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) designed to delegate oversight and protec-
tion functions to courts or interest groups may help somewhat, but “fire alarms” and
other ex post restrictions frequently ineffective compared with ex ante alternatives
(Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; McCubbins et al. 1989). Thus, at least in the ab-
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stract, policymakers should prefer “framework” legislation that offers one or a few
implementing actors substantial discretionary authority.
Here, though, Moe’s “politics of structural choice” intervenes. Whenever policymaker
and implementor possess different substantive preferences, formal mechanisms of bu-
reaucratic control - institutional or otherwise - become more attractive as a policy
strategy, offering protection for policymakers against implementer malfeasance (Mc-
Cubbins 1985). Moreover, as uncertainty about future electoral outcomes rises, re-
strictive policies become particularly appealing; if a currently-empowered group is
unsure if it will hold public office in the future, that group will likely try to pas-
sively “insulate” its programs (de Figueiredo Jr 2002). Insulation-style strategies can
take many forms, but an institutionally-oriented approach - in which policymak-
ers create complex, fragmented power structures with individually weaker and more
constrained implementers - represents one plausible strategy. Whatever the means,
however, insulation strategies are particularly appealing for electorally weak groups
and members of public interest organizations, whose advocates are likely to hold
elected office only sporadically.
These basic observations have spawned an array of insightful theoretical and em-
pirical work, which offers both policy- and politically-oriented refinements to these
initial results. From a policy standpoint, major formal studies (e.g. Bendor and
Meirowitz 2004) predict that higher uncertainty and policy issue complexity should
be associated with lower institutional complexity and greater delegation of authority.
These ideas are sensible, and match predictions we might produce using a cognitively-
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inspired frame like that suggested by Baumgartner et al. (2009). From an empirical
standpoint, Franchino (2004, 2007) and Huber and Shipan (2002) find that better-
informed legislatures tend to delegate less, lending support to this idea. Unfortu-
nately, as I describe in the following section, little empirical work in this area cuts
across multiple policy areas, leaving few opportunities to examine the relationship
between policy complexity and downstream allocation of authority in detail. Epstein
and O’Halloran (1999), in an exception to this trend, do examine bills covering an
array of policy areas, and find support for these hypotheses; however, their study is
limited to Mayhew (1991)’s list of “significant” legislation, limiting the scope of their
results.
The relationship between political variables and downstream allocation of authority
has been developed in a more extensive fashion. Various authors have, for example,
found that legislative capacity, the availability of informal restrictions on delegation,
and expectations of future electoral success are all significantly related to allocation
of authority (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Franchino 2007; Ainsworth and Harward
2009; Huber and Shipan 2002). For the most part, projects in this area have opera-
tionalized preference disagreements using simple party control of the executive and
legislative branches. However, at least in the US context, there is some evidence that
the majority party’s seat share also matters (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Farhang
and Yaver 2016).
One particular focus in this body of scholarship is the relationship between execu-
tive/legislative preference disagreements and downstream allocation of authority. As
19
I describe previously, the so-called “ally principle” - that principals (usually legisla-
tors) should be more comfortable offering discretionary authority to their ideological
allies than their enemies - is a key motivating idea throughout the statutory de-
sign literature. Moe and Caldwell (1994)’s comparison of lawmaking practices under
presidential and parliamentary government provides perhaps the sharpest articula-
tion of this idea. In classical parliamentary system like the United Kingdom, the
head of government is elected (and removed) by the ruling party (or coalition) in
the legislature. As a result, the executive and legislative branches in these countries
should pursue similar policy goals, leading legislatures in these countries to pass sim-
ple, “framework”-style legislation. By contrast, they suggest, presidentialism-style
independent election of the head of government should create more preference diver-
gence between the executive and the legislature, leading the legislature to pass more
detailed and restrictive laws.
Theoretical predictions regarding the impact of preference disagreements become
more complicated when multiple principals or implementing agents are present.
Broadly, when multiple “bosses” possess mutual veto power over a particular policy-
making choice, the relationship between preference disagreements and downstream
distribution of authority depends on the agenda-setting powers of each principal
(Bendor and Meirowitz 2004) and the policy expertise of the agency tasked with
implementing the policy (Volden 2002; Gailmard 2002, 2009). From a public ad-
ministration standpoint, Gailmard and Patty (2007) and Gailmard and Patty (2012)
incorporate bureaucratic independence and expertise into this basic modeling frame-
work, and reach mixed conclusions regarding the relationship between preference
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disagreements and policy design choices and outcomes when a choice of implement-
ing agents is available. And, in a related stream of work, Bertelli and Feldmann
(2006) and Prendergast (2007) find that incorporating constituent preferences and
electoral pressure into the basic allocation-of-authority model leads policymakers to
select “biased” implementing actors, who can credibly commit to implement a more
favorable policy outcome than that preferred by their political opponents.
Unfortunately, empirical verification of this latter set of predictions also relatively
limited. Epstein and O’Halloran (1999), in their study of Mayhew (1991)’s list
of “significant” American legislation, find that delegation to independent agencies
and commissions increases under divided government, while delegation to politically-
controlled agencies increased under unified government. Huber and Shipan (2002)
report a similarly contingent relationship, with a negative relationship between di-
vided government and delegation in professionalized state legislatures and a positive
one in non-professionalized settings. Like many empirical studies in this area, Huber
and Shipan (2002)’s efforts are limited to a single policy area - namely, state-level
Medicaid reform - limiting the generalizability of their results. However, combined
with related studies, their findings are at least suggestive of a more complicated,
contingent relationship between preference disagreement and downstream allocation
of authority than that suggested by early work in this area.
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2.2.2 The Cognitive Foundations of Lawmaking
Based on this body of work, we now possess strong knowledge regarding the rela-
tionship between formal allocation of authority and a variety of political and policy
factors. However, despite these advances, significant gaps remain. Most prominently,
as I emphasize throughout the previous section, little empirical work has compared
patterns in allocation of authority across multiple policy areas. The few exceptions to
this rule (e.g. Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Farhang and Yaver 2016) are limited in
an equally important fashion. In particular, these studies only include prominent or
“significant” legislative proposals, without examining their lower-profile counterparts.
These limitations, I suggest, are substantial, and impose serious constraints on our
ability to understand lawmaking activity as a general phenomenon. In institutions
like the US Congress, most enacted laws are not the kinds of high-profile and trans-
formative legislative actions that make lists of historically important legislation. For
example, take Mayhew (1991)’s list of “significant” legislation, which is perhaps the
most prominent example of its kind. In his description, Mayhew characterizes his list
as a compendium of the most innovative and consequential laws passed by Congress.4
As a result, Mayhew’s list is short - covering some 218 laws enacted between 1946
and 20085 - and mostly populated by the kinds of memorable, high-visibility laws
already familiar to scholars of legislative behavior.
Though by definition important and worthy of study, laws of this kind are clearly not
4See, e.g., Mayhew’s notes accompanying the 2015 update to his list.
5As updated by Farhang and Yaver (2016).
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representative of the bulk of lawmaking activity. Most obviously, because of their
brevity lists of this kind must inevitably make decisions about edge cases, such as
the Clean Water Act6 (included on Mayhew’s list) or the Endangered Species Act7
(excluded). However, borderline cases like these are rare compared with the more
“everyday” laws that make up the bulk of the lawmaking output in most contexts.
For a concrete example, take the recent history of the United States Congress. From
1989-2008 Congress enacted some 4,186 unique pieces of legislation. Of these, ap-
proximately one-quarter (1,018) were relatively trivial “commemorative” bills, which
established monuments or symbols designed to commemorate noteworthy people or
places in US history. Some 63 further laws from this period made Mayhew’s list
of historically noteworthy legislation. The remaining three-quarters, however, were
somewhere in between, neither entirely trivial nor significant enough to merit par-
ticular historical mention.
Perusing these laws in the middle category reveals a predictably mixed set of leg-
islation. Unsurprisingly, some “everyday” bills are essentially inconsequential, and
consist only of technical amendments to - or extensions of - existing elements of US
law.8 Some, however, are more impactful. For a concrete example, consider the En-
hanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (2009).9 This bill authorized some $1.5 billion
in yearly defense-related aid to the government of Pakistan from 2010-2014. Though
6Pub. L. 92-500.
7Pub. L. 93-205.
8E.g. Pub. L. 108-306, “To provide an additional temporary extension of programs under the
Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 through September 30, 2004,
and for other purposes”.
9Public Law No. 111-73.
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not significant enough to make a list of historically significant legislation, this bill
nevertheless involved substantial financial outlays and represented an important shift
in US-Pakistan relations. It also contained some noteworthy administrative innova-
tions, the most notable of which was an unusual oversight system that gave the State
Department primary responsibility over allocation of funds (Epstein and Kronstadt
2013).
Laws like the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act form the bulk of the law-
making outputs in most contexts. As a result, any theory that seeks to explain the
lawmaking process as a general phenomenon needs to be able to explain these “ev-
eryday” bills as well as their higher-salience counterparts. Importantly, existing work
in American politics and public policy gives us good reason to suspect that drafting
processes underlying “significant” laws should look substantially different from their
“everyday” counterparts. For example, consider Baumgartner et al. (2009)’s work on
policy attention:
As a given social indicator becomes more troubling over time, the
[bounded rationality] model predicts no response whatsoever during the
early periods; the issue is "under the radar" and government may not
even track its severity in any systematic manner. After the severity of the
issue has passed some threshold, on the other hand, there may be a rush
to make up for past inattention to the issue by dramatically increasing
policy outputs directed to it. The issue may be systematically tracked
and a specialized agency or bureau may even be created to focus on it.
(Baumgartner et al. 2009, 608)
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Applied to the formal institutional design context, this framework produces a nat-
ural set of predictions. Because lawmakers possess limited staffing and cognitive
resources, we should not expect them to develop precise policy preferences for most
policy issues. Consequently, we should also not expect lawmakers to propose insti-
tutional arrangements designed to express their (vague or nonexistent) preferences
in all scenarios. Instead, we should only expect lawmakers to express their policy
preferences through formal institutional design choices when addressing the kinds
of important, high-attention policy issues described by Baumgartner et al. (2009).
Importantly, as I discuss earlier in this chapter, the relationship between lawmaker
preferences and downstream institutional design is frequently a complex and contin-
gent one. Much of the existing work in the literature on formal institutional design
focuses on the ways in which institutional and political context condition lawmaker
incentives when legislative and executive actors disagree on policy preferences. How-
ever, whatever the direction of this relationship for a given law or policy problem, we
should expect the link between lawmaker preferences and downstream institutional
design choices to be small or negligible for “everyday” policy problems.
If lawmaker policy preferences do not offer a general explanation for variation in
institutional design choices, what factors are more influential? I argue that char-
acteristics of the policy area(s) under consideration offer the answer. Broadly, the
policy area(s) implicated by a particular law should affect the institutional structures
it contains through two primary mechanisms, which we might describe as lawmaker
experience with the policy issue(s) under consideration and the inherent complexity
of those issues.
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Beginning with the former set of relationships, we should generally expect lawmakers
to be more willing to create complex institutional structures when they possess more
experience with the issues under consideration. This prediction follows naturally
from the broader cognitive ideas that underlie the bounded rationality literature. In
educational testing, a central idea in many studies is the notion of “cognitive load”,
or the “demands on working memory [...] intrinsic to the material being learned”
(Paas et al. 2003). In this context, tasks which involve difficult or unfamiliar subject
matter (e.g. abstract literary criticism; complex logical reasoning) impose a higher
cognitive load on the subject than tasks which involve easier or more familiar topics
(simple mathematical computations; memorization) (see, e.g. Sweller 2010).
Translated to the political domain, this basic cognitive pattern suggests that we
ought to expect politicians to generate more complex institutional structures in pol-
icy domains in which they have more experience, since the “cognitive load” involved
in researching and designing complex systems in these areas will be lower. Since
policy experience is an individual-specific phenomenon, we should expect the cog-
nitive load imposed by a particular policy problem to vary similarly by individuals.
However, we should expect most lawmakers to possess more experience with famil-
iar, frequently-occurring issues (e.g. agricultural subsidies; banking regulation) than
when addressing less-familiar concerns (e.g. cybersecurity; space and science pol-
icy). As a result, lawmakers should generally be more willing to create complex
institutional structures in the former set of areas than the latter.
Besides these individual-specific effects, we should also expect lawmakers to cre-
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ate more complex institutional structures when the issue under consideration in-
volves cross-cutting policy concerns. Abstractly, some policy problems are inher-
ently “broader” than others. For example, take the Dodd-Frank Act10; though the
law was primarily intended as a financial regulation bill, it also affected housing and
agriculture policy through various reforms to the mortgage and agricultural futures
markets, respectively. By contrast, bills like the Clean Air Act11 or Clean Water
Act12 focus almost exclusively on environmental policy. Intuitively, this variation in
issue complexity should be reflected in institutional design choices. If a law addresses
a policy problem that cuts across many policy areas, we should expect bureaucratic
agencies and other actors that represent each of those policy areas to be involved
in the execution of that law. By contrast, for laws addressing more straightforward
policy problems, we should expect to observe a smaller set of implementing actors.
Put together, these ideas offer a powerful theoretical framework from which to un-
derstand formal institutional design choices. Generally speaking, implementing ar-
rangements contained in legal texts should be shaped by the characteristics of the
policy issues addressed by those texts. If lawmakers are more familiar with the pol-
icy areas under consideration or if the issues raised by a particular text cut across
multiple policy areas, we should expect the text to contain a more complex imple-
menting structure. For particularly “important” or “high-salience” laws, we should
also expect lawmakers to spend the time and cognitive energy necessary to craft
10Pub. L. 111-203.
11Pub. L. 88-206.
12Pub. L. 92-500.
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institutional arrangements that will produce their preferred policy outcomes. How-
ever, because lawmakers possess limited time and attention, the relationship between
political preferences and downstream institutional design should be attenuated for
more “everyday” lawmaking tasks.
2.2.3 Measurement and Selection Bias in Existing Work
The ideas I describe in the preceding section have not gone entirely unnoticed in
existing work. For example, Bendor and Meirowitz (2004) predict that politicians
should produce simpler institutional arrangements in simpler policy areas, a proposi-
tion for which Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) and Koop (2011) provide some empir-
ical support. Unfortunately, measurement constraints have prevented existing work
from addressing the two constraints (policy area and policy salience) highlighted in
the previous section. The reason for this limitation is simple: measuring text-based
distribution of authority is difficult.
To demonstrate the scope of the problem, contrast two of the most prominent
allocation-of-authority measures in the literature: specifically, Huber and Shipan
(2002)’s word-count measure and Epstein and O’Halloran (1999)’s discretion index.
Huber and Shipan, for their part, make a simple argument. When faced with two
statutes that address the same issue, they suggest, the longer one typically places
greater limits on the actions of other actors than the shorter one (Huber and Shipan
2002, 45). Using this observation, they operationalize restrictions on distribution of
authority using document word counts.
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This measure is trivial to calculate, but theoretically problematic. Most obviously,
as Huber and Shipan (2002) themselves note, length only represents a plausible
measure of of discretionary restrictions when comparing legal texts written within
a single institutional context that address the same policy issue. Outside of these
kinds of comparisons, length may be affected by institution-, issue-, or period-specific
drafting conventions, introducing substantial measurement error. However, even
within a suitably restricted comparison set, word counts remain problematic as a
measure of policy detail. In general, a legal text can be lengthy for two reasons:
(1) it may address a single idea in a highly detailed and complex fashion, or (2) it
may address many ideas in simplistic fashion (see, e.g. Maltzman and Shipan 2008).
This problem is less dramatic when comparing legal texts within a single policy
area, but even within the same policy domain, most legal documents are highly
multidimensional, and cover a variety of aspects of a given policy problem.
By contrast, Epstein and O’Halloran (1999)’s measure suffers from the opposite set of
problems. In their study, Epstein and O’Halloran use Congressional Quarterly’s year-
end legislative summaries to count the number of major provisions (scope) contained
in their statutes of interest. They then count the number of constraints placed on
the exercise of those powers, and use those two values to calculation each statute’s
“discretion index” di, operationalized as:
di = ri(1− fi)
Where fi is the number of constraint types (out of 14 identified by the authors)
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present in statute i, and ri is the proportion of major provisions in statute i that
offer discretionary authority to the executive (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 100-108).
This approach is intuitive and has proven useful in a variety of institutional contexts,
both in its original form (see, e.g. Franchino 2004, 2007) and coupled with small
modifications or additions (e.g. Koop 2011; Farhang and Yaver 2016). Unfortunately,
this approach is also highly labor-intensive. Farhang and Yaver (2016), for example,
read and coded some 24,000 pages of legislative text in order to produce data on
some 218 laws passed from 1947 to 2008. Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) rely on
legislative summaries rather than reading legislative texts themselves; however, this
reliance on third-party information produces the selection problem I highlight in the
previous section, since only “significant” legislative texts receive the kind of third-
party attention necessary for this scheme.
This limitation has not gone entirely unnoticed in recent methodological work. For
example, using Franchino (2007)’s data as a training set, Anastasopoulos and Bertelli
(2017) train a random forest classifier to predict a version of Epstein and O’Halloran
(1999)’s “delegation index” using European Union legal texts. In their paper, the
authors report reasonably high out-of-sample performance, with approximately 75%
accuracy when predicting the presence of provision-level restrictions on discretionary
authority. However, their approach still leaves substantial room for improvement,
and their existing results offer little guidance regarding generalization to other insti-
tutional contexts.
30
2.3 Hypotheses
In this project, I fill the gaps I identify previously by examining two basic groups of
relationships: specifically, policy area effects, and attention effects. These ideas can
be roughly summarized as follows:
1. (Policy) How do allocation of authority decisions vary based on policy area?
Are legislators more likely to restrict implementor authority in “familiar” issue
areas (e.g. economics or civil rights) than in areas outside their core compe-
tences (e.g. energy or science)? And, are the relationships between distribution
of authority and previously-identified factors like legislative-executive prefer-
ence disagreements conditioned by policy area?
2. (Attention) How do allocation of authority decisions vary based on issue salience?
Are legislators more willing to delegate broad policy authority to implement-
ing actors in low-salience policy areas? Or, are institutional design choices
on a given issue largely independent of the level of public attention that issue
receives? And, as with the previous set of questions, does issue salience con-
dition the relationship between central ideas like legislative/executive mistrust
and downstream allocation of authority?
Intuitively, we should expect both of these factors to substantially affect legislative
decision-making. For a stylized example, contrast a pair of (hypothetical) bills mod-
ifying the responsibilities of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), respectively. The NSF bill addresses a low-
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salience policy problem located in a policy area with which most lawmakers have
little experience. As a result, lawmakers working on this bill would likely be inclined
to write a simple, “framework”-style law, rather than investing the energy required
to write a more complex piece of legislation. By contrast, the CFPB bill addresses
a high-salience issue (consumer financial regulation) in a more familiar policy area,
incentively lawmakers to draft a more complex and more fragmented piece of legis-
lation.
Importantly, I do not argue that policy and attention factors are the only vari-
ables that should affect downstream design of legislation. Classic variables identified
by the existing literature - including divided/unified government or other kinds of
executive-legislative preference disagreements - also affect legislative decision-making
in important ways. However, insights drawn from the bounded rationality tradition
suggest that policy and attention factors are likely to be some of the most important
predictors of legislative behavior, both directly and by conditioning the effects of
other factors. Unfortunately, as I document in the previous section, measurement
limitations have prevented scholars interested in formal allocation of authority from
incorporating policy and attention factors into their models of legislative behavior,
particularly in empirically-oriented scholarship. Re-focusing the empirical literature
on these factors therefore represents one of the core theoretical contributions of this
dissertation.
To fix intuition, I provide a formalized statement of hypotheses tested in the empir-
ical chapters of this dissertation. By construction, the statements of these questions
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I give are somewhat vague. In particular, I omit most of the details regarding opera-
tionalization of key variables until I introduce my two empirical studies in Chapters
4 and 5. I make this choice for two reasons. First, from a theoretical standpoint,
the ideas I introduce in this chapter are intended to apply across institutional and
legal setting. Since the operationalization choices I make in this dissertation are
necessarily shaped by my context of interest (specifically, national-level American
legislation), introducing information regarding implementation choices at this stage
would detract from the cross-contextual nature of the theoretical points I raise in
this section. Second (and perhaps more practically), the operationalizations of most
concepts I use in this dissertation rely on a novel network-based conceptualization
and measurement approach, which I introduce in more detail in Chapter 3.
H1: All else equal, legislators should create simpler authority structures in
complex policy areas outside their core competences than when addressing
more familiar and straightforward policy problems.
This idea follows directly from the bounded rationality literature. If a policymaker
possesses less experience working in a particular policy area, creating legislation
designed to address problems within that area will require greater cognitive effort.
For example, lawmakers will need to devote more time and staff resources soliciting
expert advice and reading policy recommendations in order to craft complex decision-
making structures in unfamiliar areas than in familiar ones. Since policy experience
varies by individual, the “cognitive load” imposed by a particular legislative proposal
will vary similarly, but we might reasonably expect the average cognitive load for
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a member of Congress to be lower in familiar, high-profile policy areas like finance
or criminal policy than in more technical ones like space and science regulation.
As mentioned in the previous section, Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) provide some
support for this idea, noting that legislators tend to delegate more on high-complexity
policies (e.g. space policy). But, existing empirical work has not tested this idea
beyond the small set of historically significant legislation these authors examine.
H2: All else equal, legislators should create simpler authority structures
when addressing low-attention policy problems than when examining their
higher-salience counterparts.
The individual-level foundations for this hypothesis are very similar to those I offer
for H1. On average, low-salience policy issues attract little legislative attention,
since legislators are usually disinclined to exert the cognitive effort required to create
complex decision-making structures without constituent pressure. As a result, when
addressing low-attention policy issues legislators should be more likely to delegate
decision-making authority to one or a few implementing actors, instead of creating
a complex and interconnected decision-making structure.
H3: If the executive and legislative actors possess similar preferences,
legislative outputs should contain simple decision-making structures. By
contrast, if legislative and executive actors have different preferences,
decision-making structures may be either simple or complex.
As described in previous sections, the relationship between legislative/executive pref-
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erence conflicts and downstream allocation of authority is complex. However, as
(Volden 2002, 112) notes, “both the executive and the legislature do indeed have an
interest in increasing bureaucratic discretion when their preferences align”.13 This
idea - which is further developed by Bendor and Meirowitz (2004) - suggests that
set of desirable decision-making structures is relatively small when executive and
legislative preferences align, since both principal and agent favor simple authority
structures. By contrast, when the legislative and executive disagree, outcomes are
less predictable, and decision-making structures may be either simple or complex de-
pending on the characteristics of the implementing agent (and in particular, whether
the implementer is independent or subject to political control by the executive).
H4: The relationship between executive/legislative preference conflict and
downstream allocation of authority should be attenuated when the policy
proposal in question addresses complex or low-attention policy areas.
This idea - which represents an interactive relationship - also follows naturally from
the theoretical foundations that underly H1 and H2. Legislative and executive ac-
tors must both expend resources (cognitive and otherwise) in order to create complex
authority structures. On high-salience policy issues in familiar substantive areas,
both sets of actors will be highly incentivized to pay these costs. However, when
addressing low-salience, complex policy problems, the costs incurred by creating a
13Other studies have extended this idea to include expectations regarding future preference align-
ment. For simplicity, I omit considerations of this kind both in this section and in the empirical
chapters of this dissertation. However, incorporating expectations regarding future electoral per-
formance represents a direction for future work.
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complex decision-making structure will likely overwhelm any policy and electoral
payoffs that a higher-quality policy proposal may offer. As a result, in these situ-
ations the magnitude of the relationship hypothesized in H3 will likely be small or
nonexistent.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I make two major arguments: one theoretical, and one measurement-
related. On the theoretical side, though formalized allocation-of-authority decisions
have received substantial scholarly attention across a variety of institutional contexts,
substantial gaps between empirical and theoretical work in this area remain. In
particular, scholars have not fully explored the relationships between issue salience,
policy area, and allocation of authority in empirical work, despite their centrality
in the bounded rationality literature elsewhere in political science and public policy
(see, e.g. Baumgartner et al. 2009).
These gaps, I suggest, are largely due to measurement limitations in existing work.
Existing empirical scholarship addressing formal allocation of authority generally
relies on one of two approaches: (1) labor-intensive hand-coding schemes, or (2)
word-count methods like those suggested by Huber and Shipan (2002). Hand-coding
methods, for their part, require a substantial time and labor investment, making
comparisons across many different policy areas and across low- and high-salience
legislation impractical. Word-count methods are more efficient, but do not generalize
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easily to cross-contextual comparisons comparisons. Even within a particular legal
system, drafting conventions within a particular policy area may lead laws addressing
some issues to be more verbose than their counterparts in other areas, regardless of
their authority-granting content. In order to fill the theoretical gaps highlighted
above, then, we need a more comprehensive conceptualization and measurement
strategy.
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Chapter 3
From Text to Networks: A Relational Conception of
Formal Power
As I suggest throughout Chapter 2, in order to answer many of the key questions
developed in the literature on formal institutional design, we need a more scalable and
generalizable measurement procedure. In this chapter, I propose a conceptualization
and measurement approach designed to address these limitations, which I apply to
extract allocation-of-authority information from enacted American legislation. This
focus on the national-level American context offers two advantages. First, from
a substantive point of view, most existing work on formal allocation of authority
focuses on the American context, allowing me to build more directly on existing
predictions and theoretical work. Second, from a practical standpoint, national-
level United States legislative texts are easily available and consistently organized.
This organizational consistency, in particular, substantially simplifies some of the
measurement tasks I outline in this chapter.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I provide a detailed
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articulation of the relational conceptualization of formal power I use in this disser-
tation. As I discuss in Chapter 2, for the purposes of this dissertation I argue that
legislative texts are best viewed as relational documents, which describe which ac-
tors can do what, to whom. This relational conception of formal power lends itself
naturally to a network-based approach, in which legal documents are represented as
networks of decision-making and authority-allocating relationships. Second, I imple-
ment a neural network-based approach designed to extract implementing networks
from legal texts, which I validate using a dataset consisting of all American legisla-
tion enacted since the early 1990s. Third, I offer several short case studies designed
to fix intuition and emphasize the descriptive utility of this approach.
3.1 From Text to Networks
As I discuss at the outset of Chapter 2, my focus in this dissertation is on measuring
and studying institutional language contained in legal texts. Laws, constitutions,
and administrative regulations contain many features that are potentially relevant
for allocation-of-authority choices, such as prescriptive policy language or complex
procedural requirements. However, as I argue, there are good reasons to believe
that the institutional content contained in legal texts has the greatest impact on
downstream policy outcomes. Directive language - for example, setting acceptable
pollution rates or evidentiary requirements in criminal cases directly in the the text
of a law or regulation - is only constraining to the extent that it is actually en-
forced, which requires cooperation from implementing actors. By contrast, shifting
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the decision-making structure embedded within a particular legal document offers a
more direct way to alter policy outcomes and implementing styles, making this kind
of “institutional” language a more theoretically appealing object of study.
Besides its substantive advantages, narrowing our attention to the institutional lan-
guage contained in legal texts also offers a natural conceptualization and measure-
ment approach. When reduced to their institutional content, legal texts can be
viewed as relational documents, which describe the set of actors involved in the
execution of a particular policy program and the relationships between them. Or,
phrased more succinctly, focusing on their institutional content recasts legal texts as
networks of power relationships between actors situated in a particular policy space.
Treating texts as a network of relationships is common in other substantive contexts.
In political science, a notable example of this kind of approach is GDELT (Leetaru
and Schrodt 2013), which mines news accounts for subject/action/object triples cor-
responding to international events. Though not immediately presented in network
form, relational representations of this kind can be naturally converted into a network
representation. For a more direct example, consider Franzosi et al. (2012)’s “quan-
titative narrative analysis” approach. In their paper, Franzosi et al. use newspaper
accounts of slave lynchings to measure patterns of agency within a corpus of Georgia
lynching accounts from 1322 newspaper stories written from 1875-1930. Like Leetaru
and Schrodt (2013), Franzosi et al. identify and code subject/action/object triples
in their corpus, and record usage rates for various actors (African American victims;
white citizens; law enforcement) and action types (violence; coercion; search; appre-
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hension). They then collect these triples into a network representation, which they
use to visualize and analyze the action types present in the accounts they examine.
This approach reveals some surprising findings; for example, at least according to
newspaper accounts, law enforcement officials were targeted for coercion by mobs
nearly as frequently as African Americans, though the overwhelming majority of of
violent actions was directed at lynching victims (Franzosi et al. 2012, 12).
This approach is similarly helpful in the legal setting. From a theoretical perspective,
if we view legal texts as networks of power relationships, many substantively impor-
tant questions reduce to simple network-theoretic hypotheses. For example, work by
Epstein and O’Halloran (1999), Volden (2002), Bendor and Meirowitz (2004), and
others on relative allocation of authority to independent commissions and politically-
controlled administrative agencies can be viewed as a question regarding the impor-
tance of each actor type to their respective implementation networks, operationalized
through node centrality or influence metrics. Similarly, policy fragmentation (Kagan
2009; Farhang and Yaver 2016) can be operationalized using quantities like the num-
ber of nodes or average degree of the network. Better still, because these quantities
can be calculated for any network, these kinds of quantities are straightforwardly
comparable across any set of networks derived from some formal legal corpus of
interest.
From a more practical standpoint, a relational conceptualization of formal power
also helps to pinpoint the measurement challenges involved in a study of this kind.
At their most fundamental level, networks are constructed from nodes (the actors
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involved in the network) and edges (the ties between them). Treating formal leg-
islative texts as implementing networks implies a natural measurement problem: in
particular, how best should the relevant nodes and edges be extracted from for-
mal legislative documents? Many approaches to this problem are possible, but for
the purposes of this dissertation I turn to a series of tools drawn from the natural
language processing (NLP) literature. NLP is a catch-all term describing a set of
computational methods that attempt to analyze the linguistic attributes of a given
text. NLP methods are thus extremely wide-ranging, covering topics like part-of-
speech tagging, grammatical parsing, lexical co-occurrence, latent content analysis
(e.g. topic modeling), and much else besides. Coupled with a deep, politically- and
legally-informed understanding of the documents in question, these tools can provide
a powerful approach to the analysis of legal texts.
3.2 Nodes and Edges: Extracting Textual Implementing Net-
works from American Law
3.2.1 Constructing the Dataset
As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, my primary application of interest in
this dissertation is enacted national-level United States legislation. To study this
corpus, I therefore constructed an original dataset consisting of all enacted national-
level legislation texts and metadata available through congress.gov, the official U.S.
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Congress legislative database.1 I describe the metadata matching and structural
parsing components of this data collection effort more extensively in my substantive
chapters; however, at a high level, I use Selenium, Beautiful Soup, and base Python
HTML libraries to scrape legislative texts from the congress.gov website. I then
stripped leading and trailing administrative content from each document (e.g. date
of passage; legislative history; transcription notes), and segmented each document
into its organizational components.
For segmenting purposes, I rely on the regular expression parser I implemented in
constitute_tools, a set of utilities I designed to assist with Constitute’s data collec-
tion efforts. This parser separates each document according to a given set of orga-
nizational headers (e.g. titles; sections), while maintaining the internal hierarchy of
each document (see Appendix A for details). By default, constitute_tools further
segments documents into paragraphs (separated by newline characters). However,
since most newline characters in congress.gov’s plain-text document transcripts re-
sult from typographic formatting rather than meaningful substantive choices, for the
purposes of this analysis I simply recombine paragraphs for each parsed text.
An example output drawn from the USA PATRIOT Act is given in Table 3.1. This
sample reveals some of the complexities of the task I describe in this chapter. In this
section, the law establishes an immigration monitoring program targeted at foreign
students, and assigns joint responsibility to the Attorney General and Secretary
of State for its implementation. However, besides this institutional content, the
1The tools used to construct this database are available via Github as Legislative_Data.
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Table 3.1: Sample parsed document
Title Text
SEC 416 FOREIGN STUDENT MONITORING PROGRAM.
(a) Full «NOTE: 8 USC 1372 note.» Implementation and Expan-
sion of Foreign Student Visa Monitoring Program Required.–
The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, shall fully implement and expand the program estab-
lished by section 641(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1372(a)).
(b) Integration «NOTE: 8 USC 1372 note.» With Port of Entry
Information.–For each alien with respect to whom information
is collected under section 641 of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1372), the
Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
shall include information on the date of entry and port of entry.
USA PATRIOT Act §416(a-b). For original text see the corresponding congress.gov page.
text also contains an array of transcription notes and references as well as other
proper nouns and related language which need to be distinguished from the text’s
institutional references.
3.2.2 Entity Extraction
Entity extraction is a classic NLP problem, which has been attacked using a variety
of heuristic and machine-learning approaches. In political science, perhaps the most
common approach is a dictionary-based system (see, e.g. Leetaru and Schrodt 2013),
in which the entities of interest are pre-identified using a dictionary generated by
expert researchers. This approach generally produces few false negatives, but misses
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a large number of items of interest, since generating a comprehensive named entity
dictionary is impractical in most situations. By contrast, applying standard off-
the-shelf entity extraction tools (such as the Stanford CoreNLP parser, as described
by Manning et al. (2014)) will likely capture most entities of interest, but will also
include irrelevant entries (e.g. names of people or places).
For the purposes of this dissertation, I split the difference between these two ap-
proaches by training a specialized entity extraction algorithm. In particular, for esti-
mation purposes I rely on a particular implementation of a long short-term memory
recurrent neural network (LSTM). Broadly, neural networks are a class of machine
learning approaches which seek to predict some outcome of interest based on a series
of “hidden layers”, which iteratively manipulate some observed set of predictor vari-
ables in order to produce predictions. Recurrent neural networks - of which LSTMs
are a variant - build on this framework by allowing the predicted output for a given
data point to be influenced by the predictor variables and corresponding predicted
outputs for nearby data points, creating a recursive, context-sensitive prediction
structure ideal for analyzing sequentially-organized information. Since most linguis-
tic data possesses a natural ordering and context, LSTMs are a natural choice in
this domain, and have been used for tasks such as language modeling (Sundermeyer
et al. 2012) and part of speech tagging (Huang et al. 2015; Plank et al. 2016).
From an implementation standpoint, I rely on the neural network architecture pro-
posed by Lample et al. (2016) and Ma and Hovy (2016).2 Given a textual excerpt
2As implemented in Tensorflow and Python by Guillaume Genthial. The implementation pro-
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(e.g. a sentence or paragraph), this implementation predicts token-specific tags based
on three sources of information:
1. pre-trained embedding vectors for each word (here, drawn from GloVe, trained
on the Google News corpus and described by Pennington et al. (2014));
2. concatenated character embeddings for each character contained in the word
(trained during model estimation); and
3. embedding vectors and predicted tags for left- and right-adjacent terms.
This approach surfaces relevant information for both simple and complex tagging
rules. For example, incorporating character-specific information allows the model to
easily learn that most named entities begin with a capital letter, while incorporating
predicted tags for adjacent words allows the model to correctly tag multi-word enti-
ties. Word embeddings, by contrast, incorporate more subtle information regarding
word usage and semantic patterns, which can be used to identify words which are
commonly contained in institution names of interest (e.g. “Secretary” or “Agency”).
To generate training data for this model, I used a two-step procedure. First, I built a
custom dictionary of institution names that are likely to be present in American leg-
islative texts. To build this dictionary, I first scrape all names contained in usa.gov,
the Federal Register, or one of five Wikipedia sources: specifically, the lists of fed-
eral agencies, defunct federal agencies, House committees/subcommittees, Senate
committees/subcommittees, and joint committees. I then removed common prefixes
duced by Genthial is slightly different from the one outlined in the two papers I cite in-text; for
details, see the accompanying blog post.
46
and suffixes from these items (e.g. “United States”; “USA”), and stripped names
of states and national governments (e.g. “Texas”; “California”; “Federated States of
Micronesia”) from the list. As an additional quality control measure, an undergrad-
uate research assistant read a random sample of legislative texts, and supplemented
this list with a series of additional missing items. The final dictionary produced by
this process contained some 1360 items, representing most prominent institutions
contained in the executive and legislative branches.
Second, using the dataset described in the previous section, I constructed a set of
example sentences that contained entities identified in my entity dictionary (see 3.2
for an example). Using the dataset described in the previous section, I extracted
all sentences contained in the body of each legislative text.3 Next, for each sentence
I conducted a simple string search for each named entity contained in my entity
dictionary. If a particular entity was present in a particular sentence, I marked the
first token of the entity with a “B-MISC” tag (denoting the beginning of the named
entity), and any subsequent tokens with an “I-MISC” tag (denoting words inside
the named entity). Finally, I marked all tokens not identified using one of these
labels with an “O” tag.4 Since the computational complexity of the LSTM model I
use scales with the length of the longest input sentence, to ease computation I then
discarded all sentences longer than 75 words. This process left me with a training
3Using the pretrained Punkt sentence tokenizer, available via NLTK.
4Since some named entities are substrings of others - for example, compare “Secretary of Defense”
with “Assistant Secretary of Defense” - before searching each sentence I ordered the named entity
dictionary from longest tag to shortest, to ensure that the longest present named entity would be
tagged first.
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Table 3.2: Sample training example
Token Tag
Funds O
herein O
appropriated O
to O
the O
Department B-MISC
of I-MISC
Defense I-MISC
for O
construction O
shall O
be O
available O
for O
hire O
of O
passenger O
motor O
vehicles O
. O
Sample output, formatted according to the CoNLL2003 format. Military Construction Act 1992
§102. For original text see the corresponding congress.gov page.
set consisting of some 29,080 sentences.
Using this set of training examples, I trained the LSTM model described previously,
and assessed its performance.5 Machine learning models are generally assessed us-
ing a combination of several performance criteria. Two common such metrics are
5Details regarding hyperparameter specification are given in Appendix A.
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precision and recall, defined as:
P =
TP
TP + FP
R =
TP
TP + FN
Where P and R denote precision and recall, T (P |N) denote the count of true pos-
itive/negative examples correctly classified and F (P |N) denote the counts of true
positive/negative incorrectly classified. In the entity extraction setting, precision can
therefore be interpreted as positive predictive value, or the proportion of extracted
entities that actually represent agency or institution names of interest. Similarly,
recall can be interpreted as the true positive detection rate, or the proportion of
total institution names of interest actually extracted by an algorithm.
Most entity extraction methods perform better on one of these standards than the
other. For example, returning to the two methods I describe at the outset of this
section, dictionary methods offer a high precision (few false positives) but a low recall
(many false negatives). By contrast, off-the-shelf named entity extraction methods
offer the reverse, with a high recall (few false negatives) but a low precision (many
false positives). A common evaluation metric for binary classification problems that
assesses both of these criteria simultaneously is the F1 score:
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F1 = 2
1
1
P
+ 1
R
= 2
P ×R
P +R
Where P and R denote precision and recall as defined at the outset of this section.
The F1 score therefore represents the harmonic mean of precision and recall, and
offers a reasonable way to balance between these two criteria.
How well does the LSTM approach perform by this standard? Since the purpose of
using a machine learning approach for named entity recognition is to capture named
entities not already known to the researcher, the most relevant (and stringent) per-
formance test would be one in which we assess the model’s ability to recover unseen
entities not available during testing. In order to assess the model’s performance in
this scenario, I therefore conducted a cross-validated predictive accuracy study. In
particular, I first randomly split my entity dictionary into five equally-sized groups.
Beginning with the first group, I identified all sentences exclusively containing en-
tities from the group in question, and used these sentences to form a held-out test
set. I then trained a model using sentences containing entities from the remaining
four groups, predicted values for the held-out test set, and used these predictions to
calculate predictive accuracy and F1 score values. Finally, I repeated this process
for each group in the dataset, and averaged the performance statistics to produce
my final results.
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Assessed in this fashion, the LSTM model I employ achieved a cross-validated F1
score of 0.758, with an overall accuracy of 0.965. Since negative examples (non-
named entities) are much more common than positive examples, (named entities),
this difference between F1 score and overall accuracy is not surprising; as with any
imbalanced class problem, the model can simply guess the common class (here, the
“O” tag, which denotes the absence of a named entity) and raise its overall classifica-
tion accuracy. By contrast, the F1 score focuses our attention on both the common
and rare classes, and offers a more reasonable evaluation metric.
How should we interpret these results? Using a near-identical approach to the one I
employ, Lample et al. (2016) report an F1 score of .904 on the standard CoNLL2003
named entity test dataset while Ma and Hovy (2016) report an F1 score of .912 and
an overall accuracy of .976, both of which are noticeably better than the results I
report. However, the performance test I use in this paper is also noticeably more
stringent than those used in other studies. In most studies of this kind, researchers
assess performance by splitting sentences into training and test sets, rather than
splitting entities into training and test sets. As a result, any given entity can (and
usually does) occur in both the training and the test sets, creating a substantially
simpler measurement ask. As a result, though the performance statistics I report
leave some room for improvement, since they approach the values offered in other
work I suggest that they represent a strong starting point from which to work.
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3.2.3 Relation Extraction
Compared with entity extraction, relation extraction is a substantially more complex
problem. Identifying a particular word or phrase as a named entity involves analyzing
some data about that word or phrase (and perhaps its local context), and reaching a
classification decision. By contrast, analyzing the relationship between two entities
involves analyzing the entities, their local context, and any words or phrases which
might encode information regarding their relationship. This additional information
increases the scope of the problem substantially, since it requires the model to con-
sider larger blocks of text (e.g. words separating two named entities) and, for most
applications, a larger typology of relationship types.
Given a predefined set of training examples for a particular relation types, researchers
have had some success in generating approaches designed to extract these relation-
ships, though performance results are usually substantially lower than in the named
entity extraction case (e.g. Roth and tau Yih 2004; Surdeanu et al. 2011). Unfor-
tunately, for the purposes of this project, generating training data corresponding to
all conceivable relation types is not practical. For a project of this kind, we would
need expert human readers to locate and code pairwise relationships between all
actors based on a preexisting typology of relation types, such as oversight or joint
decision-making relationships. Though exciting as a direction for future research,
when combined with the existing data collection and coding efforts already present
in this project, generating textual networks based on a large typology of relation
types is too substantial a coding task for this project.
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Fortunately, as I describe in Chapter 2, many variables of interest in the literature
on formal allocation of authority do not rely on a detailed typology of relation types.
For example, take (Farhang and Yaver 2016)’s work on fragmentation of authority.
In their study, they define fragmentation as a tripartite concept, which counts the
number of distinct actors empowered to execute a particular statutory provision.
Though this definition might be enriched by a more nuanced definition of actor
types or relationships between them, a more abstract notion of “fragmentation” still
offers the authors rich theoretical ground with which to work. As (Farhang and
Yaver 2016) argue, decisions regarding the optimal level of fragmentation implicate a
version of the efficiency/accountability tradeoff I raise at the start of this dissertation;
in their view, fragmented implementation arrangements are inefficient and promote
incoherent/contradictory policy outcomes, but also “insulate” agencies from capture
and create institutional fire alarms and other accountability-enhancing mechanisms.
For both practical and theoretical purposes, I therefore focus on an abstract tie
type, which is similar to that identified by Farhang and Yaver (2016). In particular,
I define a tie between two actors as an instance in which two actors are assigned
to implement the same policy program. Luckily, drafting guidelines for American
legislation make these kinds of relationships relatively easy to identify. As noted in
the drafting guide for the US Consolidated Code, the “basic unit” of every section
of Code and legislation is the section.6 Laws and Consolidated Code fragments are
often further subdivided into ordered list elements of various types, but sections
6http://uscode.house.gov/detailed_guide.xhtml
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are intended to be stand-alone units that are roughly comparable in substantive
scope. As a result, if we observe that two actors are co-mentioned in a section of
a law, we can reasonably conclude that those two actors share authority over the
policy area under consideration in that section. Without a sharper definition of
the relationships under consideration, we cannot draw strong conclusions about the
nature of the connections between these actors, but we can draw general conclusions
about the basic implementation structure envisioned by the law in question.
The relation extraction procedure I employ in this paper, then, proceeds in two steps.
First, I segment each text according to its internal organization (e.g. titles, sections,
etc), and remove preliminary material, section titles, and section headers from the
text.7 Second, I recombine each text into sections, extract entities from each section,
and draw an edge between any set of entities that co-occur in a given section. These
two components combine to form the extracted “implementing network” for each law,
which forms the basis for the other analyses I present.
3.3 Applications
Before concluding this section, I examine two brief case studies to highlight the
descriptive utility of this approach. The two cases I provide here - specifically, the
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 and the America Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 - are intended to demonstrate both the promise and the
7Using the parser contained in https://github.com/rbshaffer/constitute_tools.
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challenges involved in the network extraction methodology I present in this chapter.
Beginning with the simpler case, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of
20098 is a relatively straightforward foreign aid bill intended to provide military
and developmental assistance to the Pakistan. The law authorized the President
to provide $1.5 billion in non-military aid from 2010-2014, and provided additional
military aid conditional on a certification process implemented by the Secretary of
State.9 From an administrative perspective, the law established two funds - specif-
ically, a Counterinsurgency Fund and a Counterinsurgency Capability Fund - ad-
ministered by the Defense Department and State Department, respectively (Epstein
and Kronstadt 2013). Unusually for a defense-oriented bill, the law gave the State
Department substantial authority over defense-related aid allocations Epstein and
Kronstadt (2013).
All of these features are clearly visible in the implementation network for this law,
which I show in Figure 3.1. The law contains a central cluster consisting of the Sec-
retary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and several Congressional actors, including
the House and Senate floors, the Appropriations Committees (both chambers), the
Armed Services Committees, and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Quantitative assessments of node impor-
tance reinforce this visual message; for example, as assessed by eigenvector centrality,
the Secretary of State is the most central actor in this network (eigenvector centrality
8Public Law No. 111-73. For original text see corresponding congress.gov page.
9Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, §203.
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Figure 3.1: Authority network extracted from the Enhanced Partnership with Pak-
istan Act of 2009
Line density is approximately proportional to the number of ties between each node. Node
placement is random, but is loosely related to node centrality.
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of 0.46), followed by the the Committee on Armed Services (0.37), and the House
and Senate floors (0.33). These statistics roughly track qualitative summaries of the
bill’s organization; in both cases, the State Department emerges as the most promi-
nent institutional actor in this network, with other US government actors occupying
a less central role.
From a face validity standpoint, the visualization shown in Figure 3.1 shows both
the promise and the challenges of this approach. As expected, the neural network-
based named entity extraction model I employ identifies virtually all of the primary
actors of interest from this law, including several (e.g. “National Parliament of Pak-
istan”; “Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund”) not included in the named entity train-
ing set used to fit the model. However, the model also identifies some false positives
(e.g. “Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report”; “Human Development”) and improperly
merges (House/Senate Appropriations Committees) some names. Overall, though,
these cases are relatively rare, and occupy an outsized position in Figure 3.1 because
of the visualization’s tendency to isolate rare nodes at the plot’s edge.
In contrast with the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)10 is both broader in scope and substantially more
complex in its institutional organization. Briefly, the ARRA is a stimulus bill de-
signed to bolster American economic performance following the 2007-2008 Financial
Crisis. The bill’s provisions - which can be roughly divided between infrastructure
investments, tax cuts, and direct fiscal assistance to state and local governments.
10Public Law No. 111-5. For original text see corresponding congress.gov page.
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Within the fiscal assistance component of the bill, the ARRA allocated the largest
portion of its funds via Medicaid, food stamps, unemployment compensation, and
other programs administered through the Department of Health and Human Services
(Auerbach et al. 2010). Healthcare-related spending also formed a large part of the
ARRA’s investment spending, though infrastructure programs formed the bulk of
the bill’s spending in this area.
Compared with the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, the full implementa-
tion network for the ARRA is substantially more complex. Since the ARRA covers
so many policy areas and programs, this complexity is reassuring, but it makes
interpretation substantially more difficult. Upon inspection, however, some clear
structure emerges from the network. As before, we can begin by examining statis-
tics generated using this network to learn something about its overall composition.
For example, as measured by eigenvector centrality, the most central nodes of this
network are the Senate (0.44), House (0.39), and Inspector General (0.30). Among
executive branch nodes, the Secretary of Labor (0.15), Department of Defense (0.14),
Secretary of Homeland Security (0.13), and Secretary of Health and Human Services
(0.13) appear as the most central nodes.
The node placement algorithm I use to generate Figure 3.2 provides another way
to interpret the ARRA’s structure. Roughly speaking, the graph visualization al-
gorithm I employ in Figure 3.2 places nodes with a greater number of connections
between them in close proximity to one another. As a result, a simple visual inspec-
tion of the plot produced using this method reveals that the bill contains a central
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Figure 3.2: Full implementation network for the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act of 2009
Line density is approximately proportional to the number of ties between each node. Node
placement is random, but is loosely related to node centrality.
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cluster corresponding to Congress (e.g. the House/Senate and various Congressional
committees). Institutions covered by larger titles of the bill - such as Title VII (cov-
ering the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education) and
Title XII (Transportation and Housing and Urban Development) - form roughly co-
herent visual clusters, which are placed at the outer edges of the plot. This structure
is reassuring; since the ARRA is roughly organized by executive department, we
should expect the bill’s implementing network to display a roughly coherent set of
clusters, which correspond to the major arms of the bill.
Comparing the overall organization of the ARRA network with its counterpart from
the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act is similarly revealing. For example, one
idea we might be interested in studying is the overlap between the administrative
structures created by each of these laws. Alternatively, this idea could viewed as
the degree of “siloing” present in each law, with a highly “siloed” law delegating
large discretionary authority to individual actors and an interconnected one offering
a more fragmented institutional structure. One way to operationalize this idea is
to examine the average clustering coefficient of the network. This statistic (which
is defined in the binary setting as the average number of closed triangles passing
through each node) measures the extent to which nodes in the network are densely
connected. Compared across networks, the clustering coefficient will be lowest when
many isolated nodes, branches, or groups are present in the network.
Examining the clustering coefficients of these networks gives an average clustering
coefficient of 0.195 for the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, compared with
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0.016 for the ARRA. These values possess substantial face validity. From a qualitative
standpoint, the ARRA clearly possesses the wider scope of the two, authorizing
more policy programs and addressing a broader set of policy areas. However, as
a consequence of this breadth, the implementation network shown in Figure 3.2 is
much sparser than its counterpart from Figure 3.1. Phrased differently, the programs
contained within the ARRA are largely independent, with most actors restricted
to their particular areas of expertise. By contrast, the Enhanced Partnership with
Pakistan Act separates implementing authority for its programs across several actors,
creating a more interconnected decision-making structure.
3.4 Conclusion
Overall, then, the network extraction method I propose in this chapter proceeds as
follows. First, I segment each text of interest according to its internal hierarchy. For
American legislation, drafting guides dictate that the relevant unit of analysis is the
section, but other texts might use other approaches. Second, using a custom-trained
recurrent neural network, I extract all institution names from each unit. These names
form the nodes in the network I extract. Third, I draw an edge between any two
institution names that co-occur within a particular section, forming a network of
relationships between institutions of interest.
As I demonstrate, this approach performs reasonably well across the dataset of Amer-
ican legislative texts I examine in this section. For the named entity extraction
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component of this method, out-of-sample performance results are roughly similar
to those reported by other users of the LSTM model I employ. The implementa-
tion networks produced in my two case studies also show strong face validity, with
network statistics generating using these networks matching qualitative descriptions
of their content. Though performance in all of these areas is certainly not perfect,
these results are encouraging, and offer some reassurance regarding the quality of
the outputs produced by the method.
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Chapter 4
The Design of US Legislation
Up to this point, the material in this dissertation has been focused on conceptual-
ization, theory construction, and measurement. In this chapter, I return to the key
empirical question I introduce in Chapter 2: specifically, how do legislators allocate
policymaking authority in formal legislative texts? In particular, I focus on studying
fragmentation of authority. As I describe at the outset of this dissertation, when
designing a formal legislative texts, lawmakers can choose between one of two basic
models. On the one hand, they can create a simple “framework” law, which pro-
vides few detailed policy goals and allocates authority to one or a few implementing
actors. Alternatively, they can create a complex and detailed piece of legislation,
which divides implementing authority between many actors in a complex fashion.
Existing literature suggests that the choice between these options should be a func-
tion of preference disagreements between the executive and the legislature; however,
as I argue in Chapter 2, this relationship is likely to be moderated by issue salience
and policy area. The method I develop in this dissertation offers a natural way to
measure design of legislation in a scalable fashion, allowing researchers to test these
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kinds of relationships without resorting to labor-intensive hand-coding schemes.
The remainder of this section proceeds in three parts. First, using the method
described in Chapter 3, I operationalize fragmentation from a network-theoretic per-
spective. Second, I introduce a dataset consisting of all enacted American legis-
lation passed since the early 1990s, which I use to test the hypotheses introduced
previously. Third, I describe a Bayesian hierarchical model designed to test these
hypotheses, which I then implement and interpret. As predicted, I find high-salience
bills passed under divided government are substantially more fragmented than their
lower-salience, unified-government counterparts. However, the effects of both of these
variables vary substantially by policy area, emphasizing the importance of the mea-
surement and modeling techniques I develop.
4.1 Overview
In the study on formal institutional design, fragmentation of decision-making author-
ity is a key concept of interest. Broadly speaking, institutional design decisions can
be viewed as invoking tradeoffs between efficiency and accountability. Institutional
structures that require more precise outcomes, impose more onerous procedural re-
quirements, or create more complex decision-making structures are generally less
efficient, but offer greater opportunities for lawmakers to hold implementing actors
accountable to the preferences of the broader public. Fragmenting implementing au-
thority offers a straightforward example of this kind of tradeoff. By dividing policy-
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making authority between several actors, lawmakers reduce implementing efficiency
and limit implementor discretion, but offer more opportunities for outside groups to
monitor and intervene into the policymaking process. “Siloing” each individual im-
plementor, by contrast, insulates implementing actors from other agencies and from
scrutiny by outside groups, offering an opposite tradeoff. Because institutional rules
are self-implementing we should expect implementors to be especially responsive to
variation in fragmentation of authority, making these kinds of rules an especially
fruitful area of study.
I describe my theoretical expectations regarding fragmentation patterns in more
detail in Chapter 2. Briefly, however, I suggest that institutional design choices
can be best explained by weighing the cognitive costs of constraint against their
political and policy payoffs. Creating complex decision-making mechanisms is costly
for legislators, who must invest time, fiscal resources, and mental energy in order
to create them. Legislators should therefore be most willing to pay these costs
when they believe fragmented authority structures will be easier to create, when
the electoral payoff for creating those structures will be high, or when they are
particularly suspicious of executive malfeasance.
I summarize these intuitions using four hypotheses. First, all else equal, legislators
should create simpler authority structures in complex or unfamiliar policy areas.
Institutional design choices in more complex policy areas demand greater cognitive
resources, disincentivizing legislators from creating complicated and fragmented pol-
icy structures in these domains. Second, legislators should create simpler authority
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structures when addressing low-salience issues. In these domains, claiming credit
for political achievements is more difficult, reducing lawmaker incentive to invest
the time and effort necessary to create complex authority structures. Third, legis-
lators should create simpler authority structures when the legislative and executive
branches agree on policy preferences. And, finally, the relationship between execu-
tive/legislative preference conflict and downstream allocation of authority should be
attenuated when the policy proposal in question addresses low-attention issues.
4.2 Assembling the Bills Dataset
To study empirical fragmentation patterns in enacted American legislation, I return
to the training dataset I used in Chapter 3 to fit the named entity extraction neural
network I employ in this dissertation. This dataset consists of all enacted legislation
for which both text and metadata are available through congress.gov - the official U.S.
Congress legislative database - and the Congressional Bills Project. I then filtered
commemorative bills from the dataset1, and constructed an implementing network
for the remaining texts using the procedure outlined in Chapter 3. Briefly, I first
segmented each text according to its internal organization (e.g. titles, sections, etc),
and removed section titles, and section headers from the text.2 Next, I removed the
first section from each document. In contemporary American legislation, the first
section of each document always contains a set of preliminary material, such as an
1As identified by the Congressional Bills Project.
2Using the parser contained in https://github.com/rbshaffer/constitute_tools
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official “short title”, a table of contents, or similar information, which is not relevant
for the analytical task I undertake in this chapter. I then extracted entities using the
pre-trained LSTM model I describe in Chapter 3, and discarded all named entities
that were mentioned only once in their respective documents.3 Finally, I recombined
each text into its constituent sections, and drew an edge between any set of entities
that co-occur in a given section.
Descriptive information for this dataset is given in Figure 4.1. Temporally, this
dataset approximately covers the period from 1990-2014. At the earlier part of
this period, congress.gov’s coverage is not complete. As a result, conclusions drawn
from this period should be interpreted with caution. Across the dataset, some 3467
observations (out of 4800 total) are both covered by the Congressional Bills Project’s
metadata and non-commemorative.4 As shown in Figure 4.1, the most common
topics in the dataset (both with and without commemorative bills included) were
public lands and government operations; however, all major topics (as identified by
the Policy Agendas Project) are represented.
3This heuristic is drawn from the natural language processing literature (see, e.g., Grimmer and
Stewart 2013), and is useful in cases where typographic errors or other types of false positives are
likely to be common.
4Additionally, 42 observations from other parts of the dataset were missing due to metadata
errors in the Congressional Bills Project’s data.
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Figure 4.1: Descriptive information for the enacted American legislation dataset
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4.3 Variables
4.3.1 The Dependent Variable: Network Fragmentation
Despite its theoretical importance, relatively few authors have operationalized frag-
mentation in a systematic fashion. McCubbins (1985) and Kagan (2009), for ex-
ample, offer broad overviews of bureaucratic organization and types of constraints
on implementor discretion, but little in the way of empirical operationalization of
fragmentation or related ideas. Farhang and Yaver (2016) offer perhaps the most
systematic description of the concept, defining “fragmentation” as:
Division of implementation authority over a larger number of distinct
actors, over a larger number of different agencies, and giving multiple
actors the authority to perform the same function with respect to the
same statutory provisions.
Fragmentation, from this perspective, therefore refers to the number of actors in-
volved in the execution of any particular statutory function. Farhang and Yaver
(2016) operationalize this idea a fairly direct fashion. For each statute they examine,
they read the statutory text and code (1) the number of actors empowered to execute
a core regulatory function in the law, (2) the number of federal agencies empowered
to execute a core regulatory function in the law, and (3) the number of instances
in which two or more actors or agencies were given simultaneous authority over a
particular policy area. They argue that these ideas all tap aspects of their underlying
concept of interest (which they further support using visual and statistical evidence),
69
and therefore use a simple average of these three components as the final dependent
variable in their analyses.
Translated to the network context, this three-part conceptualization scheme offers a
natural starting place from which to operationalize fragmentation of implementing
authority. As Farhang and Yaver (2016) note, both a simple count of the number
of actors/federal agencies tasked with implementing key policy programs and the
number of instances in which actors are offered overlapping policy authority within
a particular statute offer reasonable proxies for the extent to which authority within
that statute is fragmented. As a result, either of these measures offer a reasonable
proxy for the level of fragmentation present in a particular law.
Fortunately, both of these ideas are operationalizable using the tools I develop in
Chapter 3. Since entity extraction is a substantial part of the network-based mea-
surement scheme I propose, a simple way to count the number of actors involved in
the execution of each statute is to count the number of unique entities identified in
each law. Though this measure does not focus on actors involved in “core regulatory
functions” as in Farhang and Yaver (2016)’s measurement scheme, it still likely taps
the same underlying concept as the more focused count these authors employ.
Measuring the frequency with which multiple actors are empowered to execute the
same statutory function is more complicated. Unfortunately, many standard network
statistics that relate to the underlying concept of interest are not comparable across
networks with differing numbers of nodes. For example, consider a statistic like
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network density. For any given network, the density value associated with that
network can be interpreted as the ratio of the number of ties actually observed
compared with the total number of possible ties, given the number of nodes in the
network. For bills with a large number of nodes, this statistic gives a reasonable
estimate of the degree of overlap present in the bill’s implementing network. However,
for bills with a smaller number of nodes, this statistic is poorly-behaved. For an
extreme example, consider a bill with only two nodes; because only one edge can
potentially be observed, the density value for this bill can be zero or one. Because
of this phenomenon, density values for small networks will be forced towards the
extremes of the dependent variable’s range, creating problems for both estimation
and interpretation. Other plausible bounded statistics like the average clustering
coefficient - which measures the the prevalence of non-overlapping “cliques” in a
given network - are similarly problematic.
To avoid these issues, I instead measure the frequency of overlapping authority struc-
tures for a given bill using the average degree of that bill’s implementation network.5
In a weighted network, the degree of a given node is defined as the sum of all edge
weights for edges connected to that node. The average degree of a network is there-
fore defined as the average degree value across all nodes in the network. Larger
values on this statistic indicate a more densely connected implementing network,
while smaller values indicate a more “siloed” implementing structure. Normalizing
this statistic by the number of nodes in the network both eases comparison of this
5With the average degree defined to be zero for networks with zero named entities.
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statistic across networks and avoids problems with overdispersion. Without normal-
ization, the upper bound of this quantity scales with the squared number of nodes in
the network, leading to extreme overdispersion and creating problems for estimation.
A list of the top twenty bills by each measure is given in Table 4.1. Overall, the
average bill in my dataset possesses 9.5 nodes and an average degree of 5.3. How-
ever, both of these measures display substantial variation, and are characterized by
both frequent zero values (27% by total nodes; 41% by average degree) and extreme
overdispersion (maximum values of of 566 total nodes and an average degree of 708).
As in Chapter 3, all of these values display substantial face validity; of the top twenty
bills by the node count measure, nine are appropriations bills, seven are defense au-
thorization bills, and the remaining four (the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009; two versions of the Food, Cnservation, and Energy Act of 2008; and the
Energy Policy Act of 2005) are all are high-salience bills which involve substantial
construction of new programs and disbursement of federal funds. Results are simi-
lar for the average degree measure, though some codification bills also display large
fragmentation values by this measure.
Like Farhang and Yaver (2016) I find that both of my candidate measures are highly
related. As shown in Figure 4.2, plotting the average fragmentation value for each
measure and each session of Congress shows that these statistics essentially move
in parallel throughout the period covered by my dataset. Because both measures
are zero-inflated with substantial overdispersion, simple statistical measures of as-
sociation like pairwise correlation values are misleading in this context; however,
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Table 4.1: Top-twenty most fragmented bills, by two measures
Bill Title Total Nodes Average Degree
Omnibus Appropriations Act (2009) 566 411.2
Consolidated Appropriations Act (2008) 534 671.4
Consolidated Appropriations Act (2010) 458 707.6
Consolidated Appropriations Act (2012) 438 458.6
Defense Appropriations Act (2011) 448.6
Consolidated Appropriations Act (2005) 306 277.7
Consolidated Appropriations Act (2004) 277 210.3
National Defense Authorization Act (2010) 270 43.1
National Defense Authorization Act (2015) 262 58.7
National Defense Authorization Act (2012) 245 40.2
Further Appropriations Act (2012) 238 380.1
Omnibus Appropriations Act (1990) 232 19.8
National Defense Authorization Act (1996) 229 35.8
Omnibus Appropriations Act (1999) 223 157.1
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act (2008)1 220 19.6
National Defense Authorization Act (1998) 214 30.6
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009) 214 89.9
National Defense Authorization Act (2007) 212 38.5
Energy Policy Act (2005) 209 22.4
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act (2008)1 209 19.4
Bill titles shortened for visual purposes. Bills ordered based on total node value. Bolded titles are
in the top twenty by both measures.
1 A near-duplicate version of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act (2008) were passed in 2008
to address drafting errors in the original version of the bill. In this table, the first entry for this
bill refers to H.R. 2419, and the second refers to H.R. 6124.
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transforming each variable by a log-plus-one transformation leads to a pairwise cor-
relation value of 0.95. Because of this overlap, for the remainder of this chapter I
focus on results generated using the node-count measure of my dependent variable.
4.3.2 Predictor Variables
As I describe in Chapter 2 and at the outset of this chapter, my key theoretical
contention is that previously observed relationships between partisanship and down-
stream design of legislation should be moderated by policy area and by the public
salience of the bill in question. To operationalize executive-legislative preference
disagreements, I use a simple binary indicator, which consists of a dummy vari-
able indicating whether the same party controlled both the executive and legislative
branches at the time that the bill was passed. Based on existing theory, on average we
should expect bills passed under unified government should contain less fragmented
implementing structures than their counterparts passed under divided government.
However, we should expect this relationship to be weaker for lower-salience bills and
policy areas.
Besides this basic partisanship variable, I also include two individual-level and two
bill-level covariates. For my individual-level variables, I include covariates corre-
sponding to the DW-NOMINATE score of the proposing member and an indicator
variable denoting whether the proposing member was a part of the chamber major-
ity. Generally speaking, more conservative members tend to be more skeptical of a
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of two measures of legislative fragmentation
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Table 4.2: Descriptive information for predictor variables
Variable Mean SD
Unified Government 0.31 0.46
DW-NOMINATE 0.1 0.5
Majority Sponsored 0.8 0.4
CQ Mention 0.3 0.5√
Cosponsors 2.6 3.0
Appropriation 0.03 0.18
Bill titles shortened for visual purposes. Bills ordered based on total node value. Bolded titles are
in the top twenty by both measures.
strong administrative state; as a result, we might expect those members to be more
willing to fragment implementing authority more frequently. By contrast, bills pro-
posed by members of the chamber majority are likely to address higher-salience issue
areas, making legislators more willing to craft complex and fragmented implementing
structures.
For my bill-level variables, my primary theoretical quantity of interest is the salience
of the bill in question. I operationalize this idea using two variables. First, to measure
the broader public salience of a particular bill, I follow Volden and Wiseman (2014)
and use a binary indicator denoting whether the bill in question was mentioned in
the CQ Almanac’s year-end summary of Congressional activity. Second, to measure
salience within Congress I included a predictor corresponding to the square root of the
number of cosponsors for each bill. Compared with my other variables, this measure
is somewhat problematic; since important and time-sensitive bills often bypass the
ordinary lawmaking process (Sinclair 2016), the authors of these bills may not have
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the time to gather a substantial number of cosponsors.6 As a result, this measure
may perform badly for appropriations bills, authorization bills, and other “must-
pass” emergency legislation. As an additional control, I therefore include a dummy
variable indicating whether the bill in question was an annual appropriations bill or
a defense authorization bill, which should serve as a partial proxy for “must-pass”
legislation of this kind.
Finally, to capture the interactive relationship between salience and legislative/ex-
ecutive preference disagreements I posit in Chapter 2, I include an interaction term
between my Unified_Government and CQ_Mention variables. As I describe in Chap-
ter 2, I expect the effects of preference disagreements on downstream design of leg-
islation to be strongest on high-salience laws. When addressing high-salience policy
issues, legislators should pass substantially simpler laws when operating under unified
government than under divided government. By contrast, I expect the relationship
between divided/unified government and legislative fragmentation to be attenuated
for low-salience bills. Put together, these expectations imply that the interaction
term between the unified government and CQ_Mention variables should be negative
on average, though this relationship may vary some by policy area.
To operationalize policy area, I rely on the Congressional Bills Project’s bill-level
6For example, contrast the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Pub. L. 111-148) with
the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (Pub. L. 111-5). Though both bills were highly
salient and the latter passed by substantially larger margins than the former, former bill had 40
cosponsors while the latter had only 9. This differential likely reflects the speed with which the
bailout bill was enacted, compared with the more measured process for the Affordable Care Act.
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policy codes. This variable follows the Comparative Agendas Project’s coding scheme
covering some 20 major topic codes. As shown in Figure 4.1, all major topic codes
are represented in this period, though some topics are substantially more common
than others.
4.4 Modeling
To model the node-count measure of fragmentation I propose, I employ a Bayesian
hierarchical hurdle model, represented using the following likelihood function:
p(yi|ρi, θi, φ) =

ρi if yi = 0
(1− ρi) NB(yi|θi,φ)1−NBCDF (0|θi,φ) if yi = 1
With yi the node count for the ith observation, NB the negative binomial density,
and NBCDF the negative binomial CDF.7 We can (very) loosely treat this model as
a two-step regression, in which we first estimate a logistic regression to determine
whether a given observation is zero or non-zero. For the set of observations selected
into the non-zero component, we then estimate a negative binomial regression, in
which the likelihood for the model is truncated at one.
7As defined using the location-scale negative binomial parameterization in Carpenter et al.
(2016), in which E(yi) = θi and V ar(yi) = θi +
θ2i
φ . Since φ is not subscripted, this structure
implies a conditional constant variance assumption, in which I assume the variance of each obser-
vation to be constant for a given value of θi.
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The “hurdle” component of this model refers to the mixture implied by the piecewise
likelihood expression. Briefly, a hurdle model is an example of a mixture model,
in which we treat the dependent variable as a mixture of two distinct probability
distributions. In the context of this project, I expect to encounter two types of bills:
a “standard” type, which increases, decreases, or otherwise modifies the jurisdiction
of one or more governmental actors, and a “non-administrative” type, which does not
alter the jurisdiction of any actor. Examples of the latter type include “commemo-
rative” bills8 or bills which consist of technical amendments, corrections, or updates
to other pieces of legislation.9 Laws of this kind are likely to follow a different data-
generating process than other bills contained in my dataset, with very few (usually
zero) nodes and very few (usually zero) edges connecting any nodes that are present.
To separate bills of this kind from the other observations in my dataset, I therefore
treat my dependent variable as a mixture of a Bernoulli and a negative binomial
distribution.10 Bills selected into the Bernoulli component of the mixture represent
bills with no named entities or ties, and which are therefore unlikely to address the
composition of the administrative state.
8E.g. Pub. L. 102-262, “A bill to designate the United States Courthouse located at 111 South
Wolcott in Casper, Wyoming, as the ‘Ewing T. Kerr United States Courthouse’.” Recall that I filter
bills identified as “commemorative” from the dataset before estimation; however, since the method
used by the Congressional Bills Project to identify commemorative bills is heuristic and based on
title keyword searches, some examples may slip through.
9E.g. Pub. L. 108-306, “To provide an additional temporary extension of programs under the
Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 through September 30, 2004,
and for other purposes.” This bill simply extends authorization for existing provisions of the Small
Business Investment Act of 1958, and therefore provides no modifications to existing administrative
jurisdiction.
10Since my average degree measure is (approximately) continuous and non-negative, I use a
Bernoulli/gamma mixture for this dependent variable instead.
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To incorporate covariates into this model, I define:
ρi = logit(X
′
iγzi)
θi = log(X
′
iβzi)
with X a N × (K + 1) matrix of predictors as defined in Table 4.2, γ a (K + 1)×M
and β a (K + 1) ×M matrix of regression coefficients, and zi an auxiliary N × 1
vector of group assignments for each observation. This structure defines a standard
hierarchical model, in which we separately estimate regression coefficients for both
the logistic and negative binomial components of the mixture for each group. Here,
I use the policy area of each bill as the group, yielding M = 20 unique groups for the
dataset. For the X matrix, I include all predictor variables listed in §4.2.2 as well as
an interaction between the Unified_Government and CQ_Mention variables in the
count component of my model (yielding K = 7).
The theoretical motivation for this hierarchical coefficient structure follows directly
from the expectations I outline in Chapter 2. Hierarchical Bayesian models are
particularly useful when we expect the coefficients associated with most predictor
variables to interact with some underlying group structure. For the purposes of this
paper, I expect the relationship between most of my predictor variables and my
dependent variable to vary according to the policy area. In the count component
of the model, since the DW-NOMINATE variable is scaled from 1 (most conservative)
to -1 (most liberal) I expect the coefficients on that variable to be more positive on
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issues prioritized by conservative lawmakers (e.g. defense) and negative on issues
prioritized by their more liberal counterparts (e.g. civil rights). I further expect the
coefficients on the intercept and the remaining predictor variables to be more positive
for higher-visibility policy areas, which reflects the interaction between policy/issue
salience and other predictor variables I outline in Chapter 2. For similar reasons, in
the logistic component of the model I expect the intercept and the coefficients on the
non-ideology predictor variables to be more negative for higher-salience policy areas.
Fitting this model with independent coefficients involves estimating 2M(K + 1) re-
gression coefficients, which may lead to high-variance coefficient estimates or prob-
lems with model convergence. To stabilize estimates, I therefore place a shared prior
on each set of group-level coefficient estimates:
µγ ∼MVN(γ,Σγ)
µβ ∼MVN(β,Σβ)
With µγ and µβ each a (K + 1) vector of top-level regression coefficients and Σγ and
Σβ each a (K+1)×(K+1) variance-covariance matrix. This prior structure “partially
pools” coefficient estimates for each predictor, allowing the data to inform the model
regarding the extent to which policy area-specific coefficients for each variable should
be allowed to vary. In cases where we should expect a given coefficient’s value
to vary substantially across policy area, this prior structure allows coefficients to
vary appropriately. However, in cases where the effect of a given coefficient is more
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uniform, the partial pooling structure prior structure allows coefficient posteriors to
borrow precision from one another, reducing variance in these estimates.
To complete the model, I place a vague half-normal prior on the negative binomial
scale parameter φ ∼ NT (0, 5). I then place priors on the variance-covariance matrices
Σγ and Σβ using the strategy suggested by Gelman et al. (2014). I first define
auxiliary variables νβ, νγ, Ωβ, and Ωγ using the general form Σ = diag(ν)Ωdiag(ν).
This decomposition eases estimating by allowing me to place separate priors on the
location and scale of the variance-covariance matrix for each set of coefficients. For
numerical stability, I further decompose Ω using a Cholesky factorization such that
Ω = LL′, and place the following priors on the auxiliary variables:
νγ, νβ ∼ NT (0, 10)
Lγ, Lβ ∼ LKJ(1)
With NT a half-normal prior, and LKJ denoting the Lewandowski et al. (2009)
correlation matrix distribution. LKJ(1) reduces to an identity distribution over
correlation matrices, which causes this prior to represent a flat prior over coefficient
correlation. The prior on ν was selected to represent a vague but mildly informative
prior, indicating a slight preference towards coefficient estimates that are smaller in
absolute value. In most situations, priors of this kind aid numerical stability during
estimation and improve posterior predictive performance.
To fit the model, I used the Stan programming language (Carpenter et al. 2016). I ran
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four chains, with 1000 warmup iterations and 3000 post-warmup iterations in each
chain.11 Visual plots suggested good mixing across chains, with 1 ≤ R̂ ≤ 1.01 for all
parameters and neff ≥ 1000 for all parameters.12 Posterior predictive checks (given
in Appendix B.1) suggested that the model slightly under-predicted low (y ≤ 10)
values of the dependent variable; overall, however, model fit appeared acceptable.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Hurdle Model
Top-level posterior means and credible intervals for the hurdle model coefficients are
given in Figure 4.3. Estimated posterior values for all coefficients match the expecta-
tions I outline above; bills with a greater number of cosponsors and bills that receive
a mention in the CQ Almanac are both significantly less likely to be selected into
the zero component of the model. The partisanship and unified government covari-
ates have posterior credible intervals that cross zero for both top- and lower-level
estimates, suggesting that these coefficients are largely unrelated to the dependent
variable in this component of the model.
Since the hurdle component of the model is essentially equivalent to a standard
logistic regression, we can easily transform coefficient estimates to more substantively
11For further parameter details and diagnostics, see Appendix B.1
12With R̂ a diagnostic quantifying the consistency of an ensemble of Markov chains, and neff a
rough effective sample size calculation (Gelman et al. 2014).
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meaningful values using standard techniques. For example, for bills passed under
divided government, receiving a mention in the CQ year-end almanac reduces the
odds that a given observation will have a value of zero on the dependent variable
by 64%.13 Policy-area specific estimates of this coefficient are roughly equivalent in
in magnitude, suggesting that this variable’s effect is approximately constant across
policy areas. This finding is consistent with expectations; since most high-salience
bills interact with some way with the administrative state, bills that receive press
coverage are unlikely to be of the “non-administrative” type, no matter the policy
area.
The coefficient on the cosponsor variable, by contrast, offers a good example of
the payoff provided by the hierarchical coefficient structure I employ in this paper.
As shown in Figure 4.3, the top-level posterior estimate of this coefficient is small
but noticeably different from zero; a one-standard deviation decrease (≈ 3.0) in the
Sqrt_Cosponsors produces an average 29% decrease in the odds that a given ob-
servation will have a value of zero on the dependent variable. However, as shown in
Figure 4.4, estimates for this coefficient actually vary dramatically by policy area.
For most bills, a greater number of cosponsors is associated with a small-to-moderate
decrease in the probability that the dependent value will have a zero node count; how-
ever, for defense and transportation bills, a greater number of cosponsors actually
increases the probability that a given bill will be of the “non-administrative” type.
The reason for this difference is rooted in Congressional norms; since many of the
13Holding this coefficient at its posterior mean.
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Figure 4.3: Top-level coefficients, hurdle component. The dependent variable is the
probability that a given observation will have a fragmentation value of zero.
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Dots indicate posterior mean values. Thick lines indicate 90% credible intervals, and thin lines
indicate 95% credible intervals. Positive estimates indicate that an increase in the given parameter
value makes the dependent variable more likely to take on a value of zero. Posterior mean and
credible interval for the Appropriations coefficient are truncated for aesthetic purposes.
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most fragmented defense and transportation bills are “must-pass” funding measures,
these bills usually bypass normal procedures, and attract few or no cosponsors (Sin-
clair 2016). As a result, bills in these domains which do attract cosponsors are more
likely to contain few or no named entities.
4.5.2 Count Model
Broadly, the count component of the model I present - which is restricted to bills that
actually affect administrative authority - can be interpreted similarly to the hurdle
component. Since the count component uses a log-link, we can interpret the exponen-
tiated coefficient estimates as having a multiplicative effect on the expected value of
the dependent variable. For example, since posterior mean coefficient estimate for the
Sponsor_Majority variable is ≈ 0.36, exponentiating this estimate yields a predicted
≈ 44% increase in fragmentation when comparing majority-sponsored bills to their
minority-sponsored counterparts. Using a similar procedure for the Appropriations
variable yields a predicted ≈ 320% increase in fragmentation. Though enormous, this
latter estimate is also sensible. As I describe earlier in this chapter, appropriations
bills are some of the highest-salience and most contentious bills in my dataset, which
should lead us to expect these bills to be unusually fragmented.
The coefficient on the CQ_Mention and Unified_Government variables partially
match my expectations, but contain some unexpected results. As predicted, publicly
salient bills are substantially more fragmented than their non-salient counterparts.
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Figure 4.4: Second-level sqrt_cosponsors coefficients, hurdle component. The de-
pendent variable is the probability that a given observation will have a fragmentation
value of zero.
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Figure 4.5: Top-level coefficients, count model. The dependent variable is the number
of nodes in a given bill, conditional on that bill’s node count being non-zero.
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Dots indicate posterior mean values. Thick lines indicate 90% credible intervals, and thin lines
indicate 95% credible intervals. Positive estimates indicate that an increase in a given coefficient
increases fragmentation.
Contrary to my expectations, however, this relationship is essentially identical under
divided and unified government. Averaged across policy areas, a mention in CQ’s
year-end almanac corresponds to a ≈ 164% increase under divided government and
a ≈ 172% increase under unified government. Most surprisingly of all, bills passed
under divided and unified government display essentially no differences in fragmen-
tation levels.
However, as in the hurdle model, focusing on top-level coefficients can conceal sub-
stantial effect heterogeneity. For example, consider the DW-NOMINATE variable. Aver-
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aged across policy areas the ideological orientation of the proposing member has little
impact on the a bill’s administrative structure. However, this broad view conceals
some potentially interesting policy area-specific differences. Since the DW-NOMINATE
variable is scaled from -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative), positive coefficients
indicate that more conservative members tend to propose more fragmented bills in a
given policy area, while negative coefficient estimates indicate that more liberal mem-
bers tend to propose more fragmented bills in a given area. As Figure 4.6 shows, bills
in nearly all policy areas display coefficient values near zero on this scale. However,
bills addressing defense - and, to a lesser extent, labor and transportation - actu-
ally display positive coefficient values, suggesting that more conservative members
of Congress tend to propose more complex laws in these policy areas. These effect
sizes are not particularly large - for example, a one-standard deviation increase in
the DW-NOMINATE variable (≈ 0.45) would be predicted to produce a ≈ 17% increase
in fragmentation for a defense bill - but they roughly track with the expectations
I outline in Chapter 2. Intuitively, we should expect conservative lawmakers to be
differentially motivated to create more complex institutional structures on bills ad-
dressing defense and other policy areas differentially prioritized by conservatives.
Effect heterogeneity also helps explain some of the surprising top-level results in the
CQ_Mention and Unified_Government variables. Since I interact these two variables,
we cannot consider their effects in isolation, which complicates interpretation. For-
tunately, the Bayesian approach I use to estimate the model in this chapter enables
a simple solution. Starting with the CQ_Mention variable, to generate the estimated
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Figure 4.6: Lower-level DW-NOMINATE coefficients, count model. The dependent vari-
able is the number of nodes in a given bill, conditional on that bill’s node count being
non-zero.
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coefficient when Unified_Government = 1, we can simply add the posterior draws
from each iteration for the CQ_Mention and CQ_Mention:Unified interaction vari-
ables, and use the results to produce posterior mean and credible intervals for this
scenario. To generate estimates when Unified_Government = 0, we can simply use
the raw posterior draws for the CQ_Mention coefficient.
The results of this procedure are shown in 4.7. As shown in Figure 4.7, though this
variable’s estimated effect is large and positive in for most policy areas, the scale of
its effect varies dramatically. Under unified government, being mentioned in CQ’s
year-end almanac yields a predicted 300-400% increase in fragmentation in policy
areas like government operations, defense, and macroeconomics. By contrast, public
salience affects bills addressing civil rights, immigration, and environment much more
modestly. This broad pattern remains similar under divided government, though the
average effect size is larger and rankings across policy areas are somewhat shifted.
We can use a similar strategy to investigate effect heterogeneity in the Unified_
Government variable. As I predict in Chapter 2, visual inspection of Figure 4.8
suggests that the relationship between partisanship and downstream design of leg-
islation is attenuated for non-salient bills. In other words, bills that receive little
or no public attention possess essentially equivalent implementing structures when
passed under unified or divided government. By contrast, bills that receive substan-
tial public attention vary more noticeably when passed under divided and unified
government, with most coefficient estimates being larger in absolute value for salient
bills. A simple Bayesian posterior probability calculation verifies this visual inspec-
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Figure 4.7: Lower-level CQ_Mention coefficients, count model. The dependent vari-
able is the number of nodes in a given bill, conditional on that bill’s node count being
non-zero.
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tion, suggesting that - averaged across all policy areas - there is an estimated 78%
posterior probability that a given coefficient estimate will be larger in absolute value
for high-salience bills than low-salience bills. This attenuation pattern is largest for
policy areas like domestic commerce, energy, government operations, and agriculture,
but is noticeable in most policy areas in the dataset.
These findings help explain the surprising top-level results I present in Figure 4.5, and
offer partial support for the hypotheses I offer at the outset of this chapter. However,
the overall weakness of the relationship between divided and unified government and
downstream allocation of authority is surprising, and merits further investigation.
Interestingly, the results I present here actually align with those from at least one
other major study. In their book, Huber and Shipan (2002) limit their attention to
state-level health policy bills, and find a positive relationship between discretion (an
idea related to fragmentation) and unified government. This finding matches the
coefficient I present for health bills, and offers some reassurance that coefficients I
report are accurate. One possible explanation for the difference between bills address-
ing the policy areas with positive coefficients on the Unified_Government variable
and the remainder of the dataset relates to the type of bills passed in these areas.
Since bills in health, government operations, and domestic commerce all frequently
involve substantial appropriations, lawmakers acting under unified government may
be more willing to fragment authority on these bills in order to protect their favored
policy programs. Under divided government, by contrast, appropriations bills may
create fewer new programs, creating fewer incentives for lawmakers to create com-
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Figure 4.8: Lower-level Unified_Government coefficients, count model. The depen-
dent variable is the number of nodes in a given bill, conditional on that bill’s node
count being non-zero.
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plex implementing structures for these bills. Clearly, however, probing this and other
possible explanations further represents a direction for future research.
Two other possible explanations for this divergent finding are time and selection.
Since Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) and Farhang and Yaver (2016) both study leg-
islation over the period from 1945 onwards, the strong divided government effect they
identify may actually be restricted to the earlier period in their dataset. However,
this explanation seems unlikely. If a divided/unified government effect is present,
increasing Congressional polarization in recent decades should increase rather than
decrease the size of this coefficient, leading me to observe a larger coefficient on this
variable than that observed in other studies.
A more likely explanation for the divergence between my findings and those of most
previous studies is a selection problem. Because Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) and
Farhang and Yaver (2016) only examine laws drawn from Mayhew (1991)’s list of “sig-
nificant” legislation, their studies necessarily select out all but the highest-attention
bills in the dataset. However, based on the expectations I present in Chapter 2, this
set of bills is precisely the set in which we should expect to see the strongest relation-
ship between divided government and fragmentation of authority. When addressing
high-salience policy areas, politicians are particularly incentivized to design adminis-
trative structures carefully and to be suspicious of executive malfeasance. However,
since bills that reach this level of public salience are relatively rare, in most cases
considerations like policy area and partisan policy priorities are more influential on
the implementing structure in a given bill. Re-estimating the model I present to
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only include high-salience bills might help to probe this explanation. However, a
narrower measure of public salience than the one I employ might be necessary in
order to observe this effect.
4.6 Conclusion
Overall, the results I present provide support for many of the hypotheses I present in
Chapter 2 and elsewhere in this dissertation. Throughout the models I present, the
salience of a given bill (as measured by mention in CQ’s year-end almanac and the
number of cosponsors that bill attracts) consistently represent some of the most im-
portant predictors in the model. High-salience bills are dramatically more likely both
to affect administrative jurisdiction and to contain more fragmented implementing
structures.
Also as predicted, many of the relationships I examine are conditional on policy area.
In the hurdle component of the model, for emample, increasing cosponsor counts
decrease the probability that a bill will be in the “non-administrative” category for
most policy areas, but actually increase this probability for defense bills and other
bills in policy areas with many measures passed outside the usual legislative process.
In the count component of the model, the unified government coefficient is also
contingent on policy area. Averaged across policy areas, unified-government bills
are no more or less fragmented their counterparts passed under divided government.
But, for politically salient bills, the scale and direction of this relationship actually
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varies substantially across policy areas, with bills in some policy areas displaying
a negative relationship between unified government status and fragmentation and
some displaying a positive relationship.
Though encouraging, these results leave space for improvement. In particular, bills
may not represent the proper unit of analysis for this study. As I show in Table 4.1,
the highest-complexity bills in my dataset largely consist of expansive omnibus laws.
Since omnibus bill components are usually proposed individually, a more reasonable
approach may be to break these omnibus laws into their constituent components,
and consider each bill individually. This approach also allows me to more precisely
identify the sponsoring member for each bill, which offers additional measurement
advantages.
These limitations aside, the results I present emphasize the importance of both the
theoretical ideas and the measurement techniques I introduce in this dissertation.
In existing work on legislative fragmentation, measurement constraints have forced
authors to restrict their attention to single policy areas or to “significant” policy
areas. However, as I show, both of these factors substantially affect the design of
legislation, both on their own and by structuring the relationships of other predictors.
Without the measurement techniques I develop in this dissertation, these findings
would not have been possible to produce, emphasizing the importance of scalable,
broadly applicable measurement techniques for applied work.
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Chapter 5
Information Extraction in the U.S. Code
In Chapter 4, I applied the measurement techniques I developed in Chapter 3 to
analyze allocation of authority in enacted American legislation. As I argue through-
out this dissertation, constraints imposed by existing measurement techniques have
forced researchers interested in formal allocation of authority to limit their scope,
usually to a subset of “significant” laws or to single policy areas. By contrast, the
text-based approach I propose is more scalable, and allows researchers to study al-
location of authority patterns in a broader set of texts.
However, like all empirical studies, the results I present in Chapter 4 contain short-
comings. In particular, by using statutes as my unit of analysis, I potentially ignore
the effects of policy context. Except in rare cases, most bills do not seek to solve
an entirely new policy problem. Instead, bills usually operate within an existing
legal setting, which contains preexisting legal rules and an existing decision-making
structure. Treating bills as independent observations ignores this structure, creating
potential problems for inference.
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As a partial solution to this problem, in this chapter I turn to the United States
Consolidated Code. The Code is an official compendium of all enacted federal-level
American legislation, organized (roughly) by policy area and updated for each new
enacted law. Usefully for this project, the Code is also versioned. Each year, the
Office of Law Revision Counsel releases a new edition of the Code, which incorporates
all additions, deletions, and modifications to the Code generated through legislation
enacted in the previous year. As a result, by comparing year-to-year versions of the
Code, rather than bill-level enactments, I can implicitly control for policy context.
Supplementing the bill-based analysis I provide in Chapter 4 with the Code-oriented
analysis I offer in this chapter therefore offers a useful robustness check, as well as
demonstrating the versatility of the methods I develop in this dissertation.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I provide a more detailed
overview of the (potential) problems caused by the bill-based unit of analysis I use
in Chapter 4. I then introduce the US Code dataset I use for the remainder of this
chapter, and describe both its desirable features and its limitations. Finally, using the
methods I develop in Chapter 3, I analyze changes in fragmentation patterns across
the 1994-2016 versions of the US Code. After controlling for policy area and lagged
fragmentation, I find that fragmentation increases slightly faster under unified than
divided government. However, this is only substantively significant in a few policy
areas, which mirrors the non-effect I observe in the bills dataset in Chapter 4.
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5.1 From Statutes to the Code
5.1.1 The Problem with Context
Like most studies of formal allocation of authority, I use bills as my unit of analysis in
Chapter 4. This choice is a natural one, and offers both theoretical and data-related
advantages. From a theoretical perspective, most models of legislative behavior view
bills as a fundamental organizing unit. Standard ideal-point models, for example,
use votes on bills to identify the ideological orientation of members of Congress
(e.g. Poole and Rosenthal 2000; Clinton et al. 2004), and agenda-setting studies use
bills as a measure of Congress’s policy agenda (Baumgartner et al. 2009). Most
formal modeling studies designed to examine legislative/executive relationships also
use bills as their unit of analysis; for example, Epstein and O’Halloran (1999), Huber
and Shipan (2002), Volden (2002), and Farhang and Yaver (2016) all use bills as
the basic bargaining unit in their models of legislative/executive interactions. Put
together, studies like these offer a strong set of baseline expectations, variables, and
measures for all stages of the bill-writing and negotiation processes, offering a strong
theoretical foundation from which to work.
Bill-level data resources are similarly well-developed. For most key bill-level concepts
- such as issue salience, policy area, and party positioning - scholars have produced
agreed-upon operationalizations, which offer a natural starting point for empirical
work. For example, in Chapter 4 I use the Congressional Bills Project’s policy area
codes, Volden andWiseman (2014)’s bill salience data, and congress.gov’s bill cospon-
sorship metadata. Datasets like Stewart and Woon (2011)’s committee membership
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information also make it easy for scholars to connect bills with the characteristics
of their sponsors, which I use to identify the party and ideological orientation of
the proposing member of each bill. Datasets like these enable researchers to easily
collect detailed bill-level covariate sets, enabling rich, flexible models like those I fit
in Chapter 4.
Despite these advantages, bills also possess some serious flaws as a unit of analysis.
As I note above, these challenges can be broadly summarized as a problem of policy
context. Generally speaking, legislators enact legislation to address some already-
known issue, either by updating existing rules and guidelines or by reconfiguring
decision-making structures. As a result, the characteristics of any given bill depend
both upon contemporaneous factors - for example, the salience of the issue or policy
area in question - and upon the characteristics of previous bills that address similar
policy issues.
As a concrete example of this problem, consider the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act (ACA). During my period of study, the ACA is one of the longest,
most complex, and most fragmented bills I examine. These characteristics are un-
doubtedly due at least in part to factors present at the time the ACA was passed.
During his presidential campaign, healthcare reform was one of Barack Obama’s
signature campaign pledges, making the issue unusually salient. Moreover, health
policy more generally is a consistently salient policy area for most voters, ranking
highly among non-economic policy areas in Most Important Problem-style surveys.
However, at least part of the ACA’s structure is also likely attributable to the legacy
101
of previous healthcare legislation. Like most bills, the ACA is situated within an
existing political, legal, and bureaucratic context. As a result, the complexity of its
structure is at least partially a function of the existing complexity of the healthcare
regulatory state.
Unfortunately, by treating bills as independent observations, the analysis I present in
Chapter 4 cannot control for these kinds of contextual effects. Worse, it is difficult to
see how a bill-centric study could even begin to address this shortcoming. Identifying
the proper policy “legacy” of a particular bill would involve locating all previous
legislation that addressed the same policy problem, in all or in part. This task is
daunting enough for a legal expert studying a single bill, and is virtually impossible
for an entire dataset.
5.1.2 A (Partial) Solution: the Consolidated Code
To address this problem, in this chapter I shift my unit of analysis from statutes to
the US Consolidated Code. Briefly, the Consolidated Code is a compendium of all
in-force American federal legal language organized by subject, which is maintained
by the nonpartisan Office of Law Revision Counsel (OLRC). Unlike statute texts
- which are written and organized according to political demands - the Code is
primarily designed as a legal research tool. For most legal research applications,
searching through individual statute texts is inconvenient. In their day-to-day work,
lawyers are generally most interested in understanding the state of the law as it
pertains to some particular policy issue or administrative rule. However, except in
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rare cases, the full state of the law on a single policy area is not contained in any
one bill. Rather, regulations pertaining to a given issue are scattered across many
different laws, each of which offers small modifications, additions, or subtractions to
the legal rules in the area of interest.
The Consolidated Code is designed to address these shortcomings. Rather than being
organized by date or by bill number, the Code is organized by subject. As a result,
the text of any particular statute is rarely contiguous within the Code. Instead, the
text of a particular statute is often divided between many different sections of the
Code, in order to respect the Code’s subject-specific organizational structure. The
Code also reflects amending and repealing actions; so, if a particular bill alters or
removes an existing piece of law, that change is also incorporated into the Code. In
sum, the Consolidated Code therefore represents the state of the law at a given point
in time, including any and all additions, deletions, and amendments introduced by
an enacted bill up to a particular point in time.
Usefully for this project, the code is also versioned. Every six years, the OLRC
publishes an updated version of the Code, which reflects all changes made during
the interim period. Since 1994, the OLRC has also published online-only yearly
versions of the Code, which provide additional year-on-year updates to the Code’s
content. These yearly versions, in particular, offer a natural way to address some of
the problems created by using bills as a unit of analysis. Given the current year’s
Code version and the previous year’s Code version, we can be confident that any
differences between those two versions are attributable to political, legal, and policy
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factors specific to the last year, rather than to the legacy of previous legislative
enactments. In other words, by focusing on the differences between consecutive
versions of the Code, we automatically control for policy context. As a result, if (for
example) we observe that the increase in fragmentation of the Code during periods of
divided government is larger than the increase under unified government, we can be
relatively confident that this effect is actually attributable to political factors during
that period, rather than worrying that this pattern reflects a legacy of older policy
choices.
No analytical approach is perfect, and the Code-based approach I propose in this
chapter is no exception. Most notably, though the Code itself is attractive as an ob-
ject of study, supplemental data resources for the Code are relatively limited. Most
notably, no existing study connects individual sections of the Code to the statutes
from which they were drawn. As a result, at present I cannot connect individual
sections of the Code with bill- or individual-level metadata of the sort I rely upon
to construct my models in Chapter 4. In addition, in certain cases, some modifi-
cations to the Code may not be attributable to political factors. Since 1994, the
OLRC has undertaken six editorial reclassification projects, in which the OLRC uni-
laterally reorganized particular titles of the Code in order too provide a more useful
subject-specific organization scheme. In addition, during my period of study various
titles of the Code have also been enacted by positive law (re)codification legislation.
Positive law codification is a process by which Code provisions organized by the
OLRC are formally enacted into law by Congress. At least in recent cases, these
positive law codification bills - which are themselves usually drafted by the OLRC -
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also frequently involve substantial editorial reorganization of the Code Fortunately,
as I describe in §5.2.2, these projects are well-documented1, enabling me to identify
major reclassification efforts relatively easily.
Put together, I suggest that these factors suggest that a Code-based analysis can act
as a useful supplement to the statute-based analysis I present in Chapter 4. Unlike
the statute-based study I present in Chapter 4, by focusing on year-to-year changes
in the Code I can be confident that any changes observed are attributable to the
political, legal, and policy factors present during the period in question. Unfortu-
nately, since section-specific metadata are not available for the Code, we cannot be
certain which year-specific factors caused any observed changes. Still, by comparing
changes in the Code during periods of interest (for example, under unified versus di-
vided government), we can gain some additional insight into the lawmaking process
above and beyond that which would be possible by looking at bills alone.
5.2 Assembling the Consolidated Code Dataset
5.2.1 Parsing the Code
As I describe in the previous section, the US Consolidated Code is maintained by
the Office of Law Revision Counsel (OLRC). Since 1994, the OLRC has issued yearly
releases of the Code online in XML format, which contain all new legislative text,
1See the OLRC website for details.
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repeal actions, and amendments to the Code contained in legislation passed in a
given year. At time of writing, code versions for the years between 1994-2016 were
available; as a result, my dataset for this chapter consists of the 23 years covered by
this time period.
To parse the code, I follow a similar procedure to the one I outline in Chapter
4. First, I parse the Code according to its organizational headers. Usefully - and in
sharp contrast to the enacted bill data I use in Chapter 4 - the OLRC’s Code releases
follow a highly consistent format and contain a substantial quantity of embedded
metadata. As shown in Figure 5.1, the OLRC’s code releases clearly and consistently
denote section headers and legally operative language using a standardized HTML
stylesheet. This information makes parsing and cleaning the Code straightforward.
In particular, for each text I identify all tags with class = section-head, and
assign all language with class = statutory-body to the preceding section header.2
I then discard all editorial notes, citation information, and other extraneous text,
and save the resulting output to a series of JSON files.
Second, I segment the Code into chapters. Unlike in Chapter 4 - where bills were my
fundamental unit of analysis - there is no obvious fundamental “unit” of the Code. In
principle, I could construct implementing networks for each title, chapter, subchap-
ter, or any other organizational unit of interest. However, to maintain comparability
with Chapter 4, I use chapters as my unit of analysis in this chapter. I make this
2Using the BeautifulSoup parser in Python 2.7.
31 U.S.C 101.
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Figure 5.1: Example Consolidated Code embedded HTML metadata3
1 <h3 class=" sec t i on−head">
2 &se c t ; 1 0 1 . Commencement o f term o f o f f i c e
3 </h3>
4
5 <p class=" statutory−body">
6 The term o f four year s f o r which a Pres ident and Vice
7 Pres ident s h a l l be e l e c t ed , s ha l l , in a l l cases ,
8 commence on the 20 th day o f January next succeed ing
9 the day on which the votes o f the e l e c t o r s have been
10 given .
11 </p>
choice for two reasons. First, from an impressionistic standpoint, chapters in the US
Code appear to be the organizational unit that most closely corresponds to the mag-
nitude and substantive scope of the average bill. Titles, for the most part, are much
longer and more thematically diverse than all but the largest bills, while subchapters
and other lower-level sections are much shorter than the average bill. Second, from
a practical standpoint, chapters represent the lowest-level organizational unit that is
both present in every title and strictly higher in the organizational hierarchy than
sections. Since I use sections to construct the ties in the implementing networks
I generate, chapters therefore represent the most granular available organizational
unit.
Some basic descriptive information regarding the final Consolidated Code dataset
is shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. Overall, the dataset contains some 1,895 unique
chapter-title pairs and 35,362 chapter-year observations, though not all chapter-title
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pairs are present in all years. By far the largest title (as measured by number of
chapters) is Title 10, which covers the Department of Defense and the US Armed
Forces. Title 42 - which covers public health, social welfare, and civil rights - is the
next-largest, followed by Titles 18 (criminal law) and 16 (conservation and public
lands). Averaged across the period, the average title has some 47 chapters, with a
maximum of 267 (Title 10, 2016) and a minimum of one (various) titles and years.
Unsurprisingly, the total number of chapters remaining roughly constant for most
titles throughout the period I examine. Since most sections of the code are not
modified in any particular session of Congress, we should expect chapter creation or
modification to be a relatively rare event when averaged across the entire Code.
5.2.2 Extracting Implementing Networks
To construct chapter-level implementing networks, I follow a very similar procedure
to the one I describe in Chapter 4. Beginning with the initial 1994 Code release
point, I use the pre-trained neural network model to extract all named entities from
each chapter’s text. If two named entities co-occur within a particular section, I draw
an edge between them, with the total edge weight in each case corresponding to the
total number of instances in which two named entities co-occurred within a section.
I then repeat this process for all chapters in the 1994 release point. For subsequent
release points, I first check if each chapter’s text has been updated across release
points. If a given chapters text has been changed between release points, I re-run my
analysis procedure on the new text, and save the output. If not, I simply carry the
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Figure 5.2: Chapter count, by US Code title
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Figure 5.3: Chapter count frequency, by year and US Code title
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previous release point’s implementing network forward to the current one, allowing
me to avoid expending computing time re-analyzing identical chunks of text.
As an example of this procedure, in Figures 5.4 and 5.5 I provide outputs for 12
U.S.C. 29 from the 1994 and 2016 editions of the US Code. Briefly, this chapter con-
tains language originally enacted as part of the Home Mortgage Disclosures Act of
1974, which requires financial institutions to provide certain mortgage data to federal
regulators. Subsequent legislation dvided responsibility over data management be-
tween the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration Board, and
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, depending on the type of financial
institution. Reassuringly, all of these actors are placed in central positions in the
network visualization shown in 5.4, with more minor Congressional actors and other
institutions placed at the outside of the plot. Examining network centrality statistics
reinforces this impressionistic view, with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(eigenvector centrality of 0.46) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (0.43) occupying
the most central positions.
Comparing the 1994 version of this chapter to the 2016 edition shown in Figure 5.5
shows a broadly similar implementing structure. This invariance is sensible; since
the Home Mortgage Disclosures Act of 1974 has not been heavily modified since its
enactment, we should not expect to see substantial changes in its structure. Among
the changes from 1994 to 2016, the most prominent differences are the absence of the
Office of Thrift Supervision, and the addition of the Bureau of Consumer Financial
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Figure 5.4: Implementing network, 12 U.S.C. 29 (1994)
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Figure 5.5: Implementing network, 12 U.S.C. 29 (2016)
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Protection. As before, these changes reflect the regulatory history of this policy area.
Following the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis, the Office of Thrift Supervision was one of
the main institutions implicated in some of the regulatory failures that contributed
to the crisis events. Because of these shortcomings, the Dodd-Frank Act4 dissolved
the Office of Thrift Supervision, and redistributed its responsibilities redistributed
to the newly-created Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and related financial
regulation agencies.
5.2.3 Identifying Non-Substantive Code Revisions
One challenge unique to the Consolidated Code is problem of separating non-substantive
Code revisions from substantive changes to the law. Unlike ordinary legislation, the
US Code is organized and managed by the Office of Law Revision Counsel (OLRC).
As part of its duties, the OLRC periodically conducts non-substantive updates to the
structure of the Code, in which sections of the Code are relocated, split, combined, or
(for obsolete sections) deleted. As I describe in §5.1.2, these efforts can be (roughly)
divided into two types: editorial reclassification - which is conducted unilaterally by
the OLRC - and positive law codification - which is officially authorized by enacting
legislation passed through the normal legislative process. Non-substantive revisions
of either type do not alter the state of the law as enforced, and are instead designed
to aid readability and streamline organization of the Code’s various titles and sec-
tions. However, because revisions of this kind can involve substantial changes to the
4Pub. L. 111-203.
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text as written, separating non-substantive from substantive changes to the Code is
an important step in my analysis.
To identify non-substantive revisions to the Code, I gathered a list of all major and
officially-documented non-substantive Code revision efforts completed from 1995-
2016.5 To develop this list, I drew on three sources. First, the OLRC maintains
lists of in-progress and recently-completed editorial reclassification and positive law
codification projects. Second, the headnotes to each title in the US Code identifies
any and all positive law codification bills which affected the title in question, which I
used to gather a list of additional positive-law codification efforts. Third, to check this
list for completeness I searched congress.gov’s legislation database for any enacted
containing the phrases “codify”, “United States Code”, “positive law”, or “without
substantive changes” in the title. As shown in Table 5.1, this process yielded some
22 title-year combinations in which a major non-substantive revision to a title of the
US code was undertaken in a particular year.
5The earliest available online version of Code the is the 1994 edition. However, since all my
analyses in this chapter focus on the differences between versions of the Code, the 1994 edition of
the Code is implicitly excluded from my analysis, allowing me to ignore non-substantive revision
efforts that debuted in this version of the Code.
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Table 5.1: US Code titles affected by major non-substantive revisions, 1995-2016
Year Title Revision Type Source
1996 49 Positive Pub. L. 104-287
1997 49 Positive Pub. L. 105-102
1998 36 Positive Pub. L. 105-255, Pub. L. 105-354
2002 40 Positive Pub. L. 107-217
2003 40 Positive Pub. L. 108-178
2006 46 Positive Pub. L. 109-304
2010 15 Positive Pub. L. 111-3141
2010 41 Positive Pub. L. 111-350
2010 42 Positive Pub. L. 111-3141
2010 51 Positive Pub. L. 111-3141
2013 2 Editorial OLRC
2013 50 Editorial OLRC
2014 2 Editorial OLRC2
2014 16 Positive Pub. L. 113-2873
2014 36 Positive Pub. L. 113-237
2014 42 Editorial OLRC2
2014 52 Editorial OLRC2
2014 54 Positive Pub. L. 113-2873
2015 50 Editorial OLRC
2016 20 Editorial OLRC4
2016 25 Editorial OLRC
2016 42 Editorial OLRC4
1 Sections of Titles 15 and 42 were relocated to the newly-created Title 51.
2 Sections of Titles 2 and 42 were relocated to the newly-created Title 52.
3 Sections of Title 16 were relocated to the newly-created Title 54.
4 Sections of Title 42 were relocated to Title 20.
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Figure 5.6: Average change in fragmentation over time
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5.3 Variables
5.3.1 The Dependent Variable: Network Fragmentation
Using the chapter-level implementing network dataset described in §5.2.3, I con-
structed a dataset containing the extracted implementing network for all versions of
all US Code chapters from 1994-2016. I then removed all chapters contained in a
title affected by a non-substantive revision project (listed in Table 5.1). Since my
primary interest in this chapter is in examining the change in fragmentation over
time, I then removed the first instance in which each chapter appeared in my dataset
(usually 1994). Finally, following the procedure I describe in Chapter 4 I opera-
tionalize network fragmentation using the number of unique nodes present in each
network.
In Figures 5.6 and 5.7, I give some basic descriptive information on this dataset.
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Figure 5.7: Number of chapters with non-zero change in fragmentation
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Overall, the dataset contains some 43,566 chapter-year observations, with 2,534
unique chapters. As shown in Figure 5.6, averaged across all chapters the Code
has grown more fragmented in all but two years covered by the dataset. This pos-
itive rate of change is unsurprising. Since most new legislation either adds new
administrative agencies or allocates new responsibilities to existing ones, we should
expect the Code to gradually become more complex over time. However, the aver-
age per-chapter change is small, with the largest year-on-year increase (0.224 new
unique nodes per chapter) occurring in 2000. Largely, this small effect size reflects
the infrequency with which Code chapters are revised; across the dataset, only 8%
of chapter-year observations changed in fragmentation from the previous year. As
shown in Figure 5.7, this remains roughly stable across the dataset, with approxi-
mately 100-300 updated chapters per year.
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5.3.2 Predictor Variables
As I describe in §5.1.2, metadata availability for the Code is more limited than
for the bills dataset. Only two main chapter-level variables are available: the title
from which a particular chapter was drawn, and the date of that chapter. In my
modeling work, I use title as a rough proxy for policy area and date to generate
a dummy variable indicating unified government, which mirrors the policy and
ideology variables I use in Chapter 4. Because of the difficulty of connecting chapter
revisions to their bills, I do not have a way to measure the salience of a particular
chapter in a particular year, leaving me without a direct measure of this variable.
Fortunately, however, the availability of multiple Code versions allows me to incor-
porate a lagged_fragmentation variable, which helps alleviate this problem. By
controlling for the previous year’s fragmentation value, I can control away any time-
invariant factors, including the salience of a particular chapter to the extent that it
remains constant across the dataset. As I note in §5.3.1, since less than 10% of obser-
vations vary from year to year the network fragmentation variable displays approx-
imately a 0.99 year-to-year serial correlation, suggesting that these time-invariant
factors explain nearly all of the variance in the dataset. As a result, though the sim-
ple lagged term does not capture idiosyncratic year-to-year fluctuations in attention
for any given chapter, we can be reasonably confident that it captures most variation
in attention in the dataset.
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5.4 Modeling
To model network fragmentation in this context, I use a similar Bayesian hierarchical
model to the one I employ in Chapter 4. Since my dependent variable is a count, I
begin with the following likelihood function:
p(yi|λ) = NB(λi, φ)
Where yi is the node count value for the ith variable, φ represents the scale parame-
ter for the negative binomial distribution and NB represents the negative binomial
density. This structure represents a simple negative binomial regression, with λi the
mean parameter of the regression and φ is the scale parameter.
To incorporate covariates in this model, I define:
λi = Xiβzi
With X is a N × (K + 1) matrix of partially-pooled predictor variables and β is a
K ×M matrix of partially-pooled coefficients. This structure essentially represents
a standard hierarchical regression in which β is allowed to vary by some group struc-
ture. In this model, the unified_government and lagged_fragmentation variables
are my only bill-level variables, yielding K = 2. Mirroring the model I describe in
Chapter 4, I use bill title in this chapter as my grouping variable, yielding M = 52
groups.
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Based on the close correspondence between the lagged_fragmentation variable and
the current fragmentation variable, I expect that the coefficient on this variable will
be positive and significant. I further expect that the coefficient on the unified
variable will be small for most titles. In Chapter 4, interacting the unified variable
with a measure of issue salience displayed an attenuation pattern, in which high-
salience bills passed under divided/unified government displayed greater differences
than their lower-salience counterparts. Theoretically, I would expect a similar pattern
to be present in this dataset as well; however, since I cannot directly model salience
patterns in the Code, I would expect the overall effect of this variable to be small
and frequently non-significant.
As in Chapter 4, I use a hierarchical prior structure to stabilize estimates:
µβ ∼MVN(β,Σβ)
With µβ a (K+1) vector of top-level regression coefficients and Σβ a (K+1)×(K+1)
variance-covariance matrix. I place simple independent, mildly informative priors
µk ∼ Normal(0, 5) on each value in µ, which are intended to constrain the values of
these coefficients to plausible ranges.
To complete the model, I place a prior the variance-covariance matrix Σβ by defining
auxiliary variables ν and Ω using the form Σ = diag(ν)Ωdiag(ν). For numerical
stability, I further decompose Ω using a Cholesky factorization such that Ω = LL′,
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and place the following priors on the auxiliary variables:
ν ∼ NT (0, 10)
L ∼ LKJ(1)
With NT a half-normal prior, and LKJ denoting the Lewandowski et al. (2009)
correlation matrix distribution. LKJ(1) reduces to an identity distribution over
correlation matrices, which causes this prior to represent a flat prior over coefficient
correlation. As usual, I selected the prior values on ν to represent a vague but mildly
informative prior, indicating a slight preference towards coefficient estimates that
are smaller in absolute value. In most situations, priors of this kind aid numerical
stability during estimation and improve posterior predictive performance.
To fit the model, I used the Stan programming language (Carpenter et al. 2016). I
ran four chains, with 750 warmup iterations and 1750 post-warmup iterations in each
chain. Visual plots suggested reasonable mixing across chains, with 1 ≤ R̂ ≤ 1.1 for
all parameters and neff ≥ 500 for all parameters.6
6With R̂ a diagnostic quantifying the consistency of an ensemble of Markov chains, and neff a
rough effective sample size calculation (Gelman et al. 2014). See Appendix B for further details.
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Figure 5.8: Top-level non-intercept coefficients
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5.5 Results
As with any hierarchical model, a good place to begin in this context is by exam-
ining top-level coefficients. As shown in Figure 5.8, the coefficient associated with
the lagged_fragmentation variable is positive and clearly larger than zero, echoing
the clear and strongly positive relationship between the present and lagged depen-
dent variable I noted previously. As in Chapter 4, the coefficient associated with
the unified_government variable is indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that di-
vided/unified government has a limited impact on fragmentation patterns in the US
Code.
As I note in Chapter 4, examining top-level coefficients in a hierarchical model can
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Figure 5.9: Lower-level Unified_Government coefficients
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conceal substantial effect heterogeneity. In Figure 5.9, I show the estimated coeffi-
cient values for the unified_government variable by title of the US Code. At least
in this case, though, the estimated effect of the unified_government variable is re-
markably consistent across policy areas, with 10% or more of the posterior density
both above and below zero for all titles.
As in Chapter 4, this lack of a clear relationship between ideology and downstream
design of legislation is surprising, and suggests some interesting directions for fu-
ture research. One possible explanation for this finding in the Code-based analyses
I present in this chapter is my inability to directly control for issue salience, and
generating a plausible measure of issue salience for the Code dataset represents an
important direction for future work. However, since both the bills dataset and the
Code datasets display a minimal relationship between ideology and downstream in-
stitutional design choices, it seems likely that the relationship between ideology and
design of legislation is at best a weak one.
One other possible explanation for the gap between my findings here and those in
studies like Farhang and Yaver (2016) and Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) is the time-
frame of the datasets under consideration. An array of scholars have demonstrated
that post-1994 American politics displays substantially different patterns than the
rest of the post-World War 2 era, with sharper ideological divisions and a broader use
of “exceptional” procedural tactics. Since datasets like those used by Farhang and
Yaver (2016) draw most of their observations from the pre-1994 period, one possible
explanation for the divergence between my findings and theirs is this difference in
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timeframe. Using the methods I develop to examine pre-1994 legislation would be a
possible way to probe this difference, and represents an exciting direction for future
work.
5.6 Conclusion
Put together, the results I present in this section largely reinforce the findings I
describe in Chapter 4. As I describe at the outset of this chapter, a possible problem
with the bills-based approach is that it leaves me unable to properly control for
policy context. Switching from the bills dataset to the US Code leaves me with an
impoverished coefficient set; however, in exchange, the versioned nature of the Code
allows me to control for policy context by controlling for lagged fragmentation values.
Similarly to the bills dataset, the US Code also displays a minimal relationship
between divided/unified government and downstream allocation of authority, both
on average and within most policy areas.
This analysis leaves a number of directions for future work. In both the bills and
the Code datasets, expanding backwards in time would help pinpoint the source of
the differences between my results and those reported in related work. In the Code
dataset, extracting a parallel salience measure to the one I use in the bills dataset
would serve a similar role. One possible direction here is to use the citation notes
in each Code chapter to connect the content of that chapter with the corresponding
metadata for any cited bills, which would allow me to bridge the gap between these
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two datasets.
For the time being, however, it seems clear from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 that ide-
ology is a less significant predictor of downstream institutional design choices than
other studies have suggested. Importantly, the results I present should not be read
to suggest that executive/legislative preference disagreements have no impact on
downstream institutional design choices; instead, my results suggest that, at least
for average, day-to-day lawmaking, policy area and issue salience are far more impor-
tant predictors of administrative structure than ideological differences between the
executive and legislative branches. When dealing with high-salience issues and pol-
icy areas, ideology may affect legislative behavior more substantially, but at least for
the time period I examine the scope of this effect does not appear to be particularly
large.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
At the outset of this dissertation, I began with a simple question: how do legisla-
tors allocate policymaking authority? This question - or variants thereof - intrigues
members of the broader public and has attracted extensive attention in both the
legal and political science literatures. Unfortunately, existing public and academic
discourse surrounding formal allocation of authority is constrained by serious data
availability problems. Both for expert academics and for interested citizens, reading
legal texts is difficult, and extracting usable information from these documents is all
the more so. As a result, public debate regarding legal texts is often misinformed
and the corresponding academic work is limited.
Over the course of this project, I have sought to address these limitations in three
parts. First, from a theoretical standpoint, I highlight the gaps that the measurement
limitations I identify have caused. As all researchers understand - at least implicitly
- measurement structures thought, both by highlighting provocative patterns and
by enabling empirical work on measurable questions. In the literature on formal
allocation of authority, the labor-intensive nature of existing measurement techniques
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have generally forced scholars to limit their attention to single policy areas or a
small subset of “significant” legislation. However, as I suggest in Chapter 2, based on
existing studies of the cognitive dynamics of lawmaker behavior, we should expect
these variables to be some of the most important predictors of downstream allocation
of authority. By selecting on these variables, existing scholarship therefore misses
some of the most important features of the statutory design process.
Second, from a conceptualization and measurement standpoint, I introduce a new
scheme designed to capture the institutional features of legal language, which I im-
plement using a machine learning approach. In particular, in Chapter 3 I argue that
legal documents are best viewed as relational texts, which describe which actors
can take which kinds of actions, under which circumstances, and in collaboration
with whom. This conceptualization scheme allows researchers to take advantage of
mathematical and visualization tools from the network analysis literature, offering a
helpful way for researchers to communicate their ideas amongst one another and to
members of the public. I then develop, implement, and test a machine learning-based
strategy designed to extract implementing networks from legal texts, which I find
works well on a pilot dataset of American enacted legislation.
Third, from an empirical standpoint, I use the measurement tools I develop to investi-
gate institutional design patterns in American legislation. In particular, I investigate
fragmentation of implementing networks in legislative texts. In Chapter 4, I use the
tools I develop in this dissertation to extract implementing networks from all Amer-
ican legislation enacted since 1990. I then link this dataset with bill- and legislator-
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level metadata, and use a hierarchical Bayesian model to examine the relationship
between policy area, issue salience, executive-legislative preference disagreements,
and fragmentation of each bill’s implementing network. As predicted, I find that
bills addressing more salient policy areas and policy issues are substantially more
fragmented than their counterparts addressing low-salience policy areas and issues.
Executive-legislative preference disagreements matter as well, but the effect of this
variable is more muted. In some policy areas, high-salience bills passed under unified
government are more complex than their unified-government counterparts, but this
relationship is relatively weak, limited to a small set of policy areas, and disappears
entirely for lower-salience bills.
Finally, in Chapter 5 I supplement this analysis by examining year-on-year changes in
fragmentation patterns in the US Code. One potential concern with the bills dataset
I examine in Chapter 4 is that it potentially ignores policy context. Except in rare
cases, bills are usually passed in order to modify some existing administrative or
policy structure, rather than to address some novel policy problem. By treating bills
as independent units, I therefore ignore the preexisting legal and policy context they
address. As a partial solution, I therefore turn to the US Code. Unlike the Statutes
at Large, the US Code is versioned, which allows me to isolate variation due to time
point-specific factors. After controlling for lagged fragmentation and policy area, I
find that fragmentation patterns increase slightly faster under unified than divided
government. This effect is consistent across policy areas but substantively small,
mirroring my findings in Chapter 4.
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The work I present here leaves a number of directions for future research. Within
the domain of American legislation, comparing enacted legislation to proposed but
unpassed bills would allow me to compare majority- and minority-proposed legisla-
tion in a more direct fashion, without selecting for passage. Similarly, comparing the
changes in enacted bills across drafts would offer additional insights into the negoti-
ating process underlying each bill, and would allow me to identify the contributions
of each individual legislator in a more direct fashion.
Moving beyond the United States, the approach I develop also offer exciting opportu-
nities for comparatively-oriented work. For example, Moe and Caldwell (1994) argue
that executive independence from the legislative branch is likely to play a key role
in determining the structure of the administrative state. In parliamentary systems,
they suggest, because the executive is elected by the legislature the bureaucracy and
the legislative branch are likely to posses similar preferences, leading the legislature
to pass simple, “framework”-style laws. By contrast, legislators operating in presi-
dential systems are more likely to possess divergent interests from the legislature,
and are therefore more likely to pass more restrictive legislation. The measurement
techniques I develop in this dissertation offer a way for researchers to test these and
related hypotheses directly, without resorting to single policy areas or small sets of
“significant” legislation.
Last - but certainly not least - the conceptual and methodological framework I de-
velop in this dissertation provides new avenues for public engagement with legal
language. For both experts and non-experts alike, legal language is difficult to read.
131
As a result, tools that help readers to extract useful language from laws, constitu-
tions, and other legal texts in a quick and efficient fashion have broad applications
both within academia and in the broader public discourse. The network-based visu-
alizations and data analysis schemes I present offer one such public engagement tool,
which can help inform policy debates beyond the academic domain.
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Appendices
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Appendix A
Statutory Text Parsing Details
Header Regular Expressions
Table A.1 gives the set of regular expressions used as inputs to the constitute_tools
parser, which I use to parse the American legislative text database I introduce in
Chapter 3. Note that the list of regular expressions given in this table does not
fully capture the set of organizational levels present in American legal language. For
example, nearly all major American legislation contains “Title” or variants, which
are not captured by this list.
My rationale for excluding some kinds of organizational headers from this list is
straightforward. Like many legal corpora, American legislative texts are not written
in an entirely consistent fashion. As a result, attempting to capture all organizational
headers present across the whole corpus I examine would be highly labor-intensive.
Moreover, attempting to extract an organizational header without fully understand-
ing the range of variation present in the corpus can actually do more harm than
good; since regular expressions are so flexible, including an overly broad set of reg-
ular expressions intended to capture a missing level can potentially consume legally
134
significant language, leading to missing information. By contrast, excluding an or-
ganizational header entirely simply introduces a few extraneous words into the set
of language under consideration, especially for rarer headers like “Title”.
The selection of regular expressions that I do include in A.1 are included for two
reasons. First, as I note in-text, the Office of Law Revision Counsel stipulates that
“Sections” of American legislation should be comparable in their substantive scope,
which is a structural standard on which I heavily rely throughout my analysis. Seg-
menting sections is therefore the most critical part of the parsing and text-cleaning
task, which is why the regular expression corresponding to “Section” in Table A.1
captures so many special cases and variations. Second, the other headers I include
are ubiquitous in nearly every document in the dataset; as a result, excluding them
from the list would introduce substantial extraneous language.
Table A.1: Regular expressions used to parse American legislative texts
Regular Expression Sample Plain-Text Match
(SECTION|SEC\.)\s*\.?\s*(&amp;lt;&amp;lt;
NOTE: [0-9]+ USC [-0-9a-z]+\.?\s*’)]
SECTION 101; SEC. 446a
(note)?\.?&amp;gt;&amp;gt;)?\s*[0-9]+\.\s* 344.
\([a-z]\) (a)
\([0-9]+\) (34)
\([A-Z]\) (C)
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LSTM Parameter Specification
As described in Chapter 3, I use an LSTM to extract named entities from legislative
texts. For the hidden character and word embedding layers, I used a layer sizes of
100 and 300 nodes, respectively. As mentioned in-text, rather than training word
embeddings directly I used pre-trained embeddings drawn from Pennington et al.
(2014)’s GloVe dataset. Like virtually all neural network applications, I trained this
model using stochastic gradient descent.1 I trained the model for 5 epochs, using
90% of pre-identified named entities for training and 10% as a held-out test set. To
avoid overfitting, I use a dropout rate of 0.5 and a batch size of 20, with a learning
rate of 0.015, a learning rate decay of 0.05, and a gradient clipping value of 5.0.
1Specifically, an ADAM optimizer. See Kingma and Ba (2014) for details.
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Appendix B
Bayesian Model Details
Enacted Legislation Count Model
Besides the parameter settings given in-text at §4.3, I also initialize all parameter
values at 0, and use a maximum treedepth of 15 and an adapt_delta value of
0.98. Initial experiments suggested that the default maximum treedepth (10) was
sometimes exceeded and a small number of divergent transitions were sometimes
encountered with the default adaptation-phase acceptance probability. Increasing
these parameters eliminated these problems.
Following Gelman et al. (2014), in Figure B.2 I visually assess model fit using poste-
rior predictive checks. In each plot, I provide the observed density of the node count
dependent variable, overlaid on density plots for 400 simulated dependent variable
datasets based on randomly-selected post-warmup posterior parameter draws. As
shown in the left-hand panel, across the whole dataset the model fit is excellent.
Zooming in on smaller values (where most posterior density is located) reveals that
the model slightly under-fits at very small values of the dependent variable (y ≤ 10).
Even in this range, however, model fit remains acceptable.
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Figure B.1: Posterior predictive plots for the node count dependent variable
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Consolidated Code Count Model
For the Consolidated Code model I describe in §5.4, I initialized all parameter val-
ues at zero and used a maximum treedepth of 13. As with the enacted legislation
model, I visually assessed model fit using posterior predictive checks. In each plot, I
provide the observed density of the node count dependent variable, overlaid on den-
sity plots for 400 simulated dependent variable datasets based on randomly-selected
post-warmup posterior parameter draws.
Like the bills model, this model underfits the data slightly at low values of the de-
pendent variable, and overfits slightly at large values, but overall, model fit appears
acceptable. Rarely, this model also produces unrealistically large predictions on the
dependent variable. Across the 7000 post-warmup samples, the largest prediction
produced was approximately 1e6, while the largest actually-observed value for the
dependent variable was 411. Likely, this divergence is due to the high correlation
between the Lagged_Fragmentation variable and the dependent variable; since pre-
dictions on the dependent variable are so dependent on the estimated coefficient for
the Lagged_Fragmentation variable, if the model happens to draw an implausibly
large value for the coefficient for this variable, the resulting prediction will also be
implausibly large. Since model fit overall appears to be good, this pattern is not
especially concerning, but it is worth noting for future iterations of this model.
139
Figure B.2: Posterior predictive plots for the node count dependent variable
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